This was introduced when we started checking the return from
ipadb_get_context() to silence another coverity report.
That condition can never be true in this function but whatever ... let's
silence Coverity once again :)
Some of these are not real defects, because we are guaranteed to have valid
context in some functions, and checks are not necessary.
I added the checks anyway in order to silence Coverity on these issues.
One meleak on error condition was fixed in
daemons/ipa-kdb/ipa_kdb_pwdpolicy.c
Silence errors in ipa-client/ipa-getkeytab.c, the code looks wrong, but it is
actually fine as we count before hand so we never actually use the wrong value
that is computed on the last pass when p == 0
Fixes: https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/2488
IPA winsync plugin failed to replicate users when default user group
was non-posix even though User Private Groups (UPG) were enabled
on the server. Both their uidNumber and gidNumber were empty and
they missed essential object classes. When the default user group
was made posix and UPG was disabled it did not set gidNumber to
the default group gidNumber.
This patch improves this behavior to set gidNumber correctly
according to UPG configuration and the default group status
(posix/non-posix). 4 situations can occur, the following list
specifies what value is assigned to user gidNumber:
1) Default group posix, UPG enabled: gidNumber = UPG gidNumber
2) Default group posix, UPG disabled: gidNumber = default
group gidNumber
3) Default group non-posix, UPG enabled: gidNumber = UPG gidNumber
4) Default group non-posix, UPG disabled: an error is printed to
the dirsrv log as the gidNumber cannot be retrieved. User
is replicated in the same way as before this patch, i.e.
without essential object classes.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/2436
These definitions were needed during development to be a le to build against
krb5 version < 1.10
These function headers and defintions are now available in 1.10 that is a hard
dependency for freeipa 3.0, so we can safely drop them.
User always receives the same error message if he changes his password
via "ipa passwd" command and the new password fails configured
password policy. He then has to investigate on his own the actual
reason why was the policy violated. This patch improves our SLAPI PWD
plugins to provide a better error message explaining the violation
reason.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/2067
This patch requires a forthcoming change in MIT libraries which allows to pass
NULL for the server_key to the krb5_pac_verify() function.
In most cases we should always only check the KDC checksum to verify the PAC
validity.
The only exception is when we are releasing a ticket to a client from another
realm. In this case the only signature we can check is the server checksum, and
we use the cross-realm key to validate in this case.
The previous code was working for normal cases because the kdc uses the same
key to create the server and the kdc checksum for a TGT, but that is not true
for evidence tickets (s4u2proxy) or cross-realm TGTs.
Fixes: https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/2169
We were not searching for objectclass so the test to se if a user had the
posixAccount attribute was failing and the user was not marked as ipa_user.
This in turn caused us to not synchronize legacy hashes by not trying to store
the userPassword attribute.
Fixes: https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/1820
Instead of checking the individual SSFs for SASL, SSL/TLS and LDAPI connection
the global SSF is checked for password changes and enrollments.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/1877
Expiration time should be enforced as per policy only for users and only when a
password change occurs, ina ll other cases we should just let kadmin decide
whther it is going to set a password expiration time or just leave it empty.
In general service tickts have strong random passwords so they do not need a
password policy or expiration at all.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/1839