NIST SP 800-63-3B sets a recommendation to have password length upper bound limited in A.2:
https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html#appA
Users should be encouraged to make their passwords as lengthy as they
want, within reason. Since the size of a hashed password is independent
of its length, there is no reason not to permit the use of lengthy
passwords (or pass phrases) if the user wishes. Extremely long passwords
(perhaps megabytes in length) could conceivably require excessive
processing time to hash, so it is reasonable to have some limit.
FreeIPA already applied 256 characters limit for non-random passwords
set through ipa-getkeytab tool. The limit was not, however, enforced in
other places.
MIT Kerberos limits the length of the password to 1024 characters in its
tools. However, these tools (kpasswd and 'cpw' command of kadmin) do not
differentiate between a password larger than 1024 and a password of 1024
characters. As a result, longer passwords are silently cut off.
To prevent silent cut off for user passwords, use limit of 1000
characters.
Thus, this patch enforces common limit of 1000 characters everywhere:
- LDAP-based password changes
- LDAP password change control
- LDAP ADD and MOD operations on clear-text userPassword
- Keytab setting with ipa-getkeytab
- Kerberos password setting and changing
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/8268
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <ssorce@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Simo Sorce <ssorce@redhat.com>
Password changes performed by cn=Directory Manager are excluded from
password policy checks according to [1]. This is correctly handled by
ipa-pwd-extop in case of a normal Kerberos principal in IPA. However,
non-kerberos accounts were not excluded from the check.
As result, password updates for PKI CA admin account in o=ipaca were
failing if a password policy does not allow a password reuse. We are
re-setting the password for PKI CA admin in ipa-replica-prepare in case
the original directory manager's password was updated since creation of
`cacert.p12`.
Do password policy check for non-Kerberos accounts only if it was set by
a regular user or admin. Changes performed by a cn=Directory Manager and
passsync managers should be excluded from the policy check.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/7181
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
[1] https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_directory_server/10/html/administration_guide/user_account_management-managing_the_password_policy
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Christian Heimes <cheimes@redhat.com>
Use a helper function to perform operations on dates in LDAP attributes.
Related to #2795
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Kupka <dkupka@redhat.com>
Whe requesting a keytab the salt used is the NORMAL type (for backwards and AD
compatibility), however since we added alias support we need to search for the
krbCanonicalName in preference, hen nothing is specified, and for the requested
principal name when a getkeytab operation is performed. This is so that the
correct salt can be applied. (Windows AD uses some peculiar aliases for some
special accounts to generate the salt).
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
There are no major changes in this commit other than changing filenames
and symbols to have consistent namespaces. This prepares for larger
changes to come in subsequent commits.
Reviewed-By: Thierry Bordaz <tbordaz@redhat.com>
Prevent the ipa-pwd-extop plugin from re-generating keys when kadimn is storing
a new set of keys. Only generate the userPassword and sambaXXPassword hashes.
Also avoid checking policies in this case and if history is provided avoid
regenerating the passwordHistory too.
Setting 0 will work as MIT KDCs assume the current master key when that is
found. But it is a legacy compatibility mode and we should instead set the
proper mkvno number on keys so changeing master key becomes possible w/o
having to do a dump reload and stopping the service. This is especially
important in replicated environments.
Remove the LDAP_DEPRECATED constant and do not use functions that are
marked as deprecated in recent OpenLDAP releases. Also always define
WITH_{MOZLDAP,OPENLDAP} since there are conditional header includes that
depend on that constant.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/576
The changes include:
* Change license blobs in source files to mention GPLv3+ not GPLv2 only
* Add GPLv3+ license text
* Package COPYING not LICENSE as the license blobs (even the old ones)
mention COPYING specifically, it is also more common, I think
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/239
Don't use KRB5_PRIVATE.
The patch implements and uses the following krb5 functions that are
otherwise private in recent MIT Kerberos releases:
* krb5_principal2salt_norealm
* krb5_free_ktypes
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <ssorce@redhat.com>
The plugin was getting difficult to read and maintain.
Split it (and apply cosmetic cleanups to some functions) in smaller
pieces that perform specific tasks.
