Files
freeipa/install
Christian Heimes 4911a3f055 Prevent local account takeover
It was found that if an account was created with a name corresponding to
an account local to a system, such as 'root', was created via IPA, such
account could access any enrolled machine with that account, and the local
system privileges. This also bypass the absence of explicit HBAC rules.

root principal alias
-------------------

The principal "root@REALM" is now a Kerberos principal alias for
"admin". This prevent user with "User Administrator" role or
"System: Add User" privilege to create an account with "root" principal
name.

Modified user permissions
-------------------------

Several user permissions no longer apply to admin users and filter on
posixaccount object class. This prevents user managers from modifying admin
acounts.

- System: Manage User Certificates
- System: Manage User Principals
- System: Manage User SSH Public Keys
- System: Modify Users
- System: Remove Users
- System: Unlock user

``System: Unlock User`` is restricted because the permission also allow a
user manager to lock an admin account. ``System: Modify Users`` is restricted
to prevent user managers from changing login shell or notification channels
(mail, mobile) of admin accounts.

New user permission
-------------------

- System: Change Admin User password

The new permission allows manipulation of admin user password fields. By
default only the ``PassSync Service`` privilege is allowed to modify
admin user password fields.

Modified group permissions
--------------------------

Group permissions are now restricted as well. Group admins can no longer
modify the admins group and are limited to groups with object class
``ipausergroup``.

- System: Modify Groups
- System: Remove Groups

The permission ``System: Modify Group Membership`` was already limited.

Notes
-----

Admin users are mostly unaffected by the new restrictions, except for
the fact that admins can no longer change krbPrincipalAlias of another
admin or manipulate password fields directly. Commands like ``ipa passwd
otheradmin`` still work, though. The ACI ``Admin can manage any entry``
allows admins to modify other entries and most attributes.

Managed permissions don't install ``obj.permission_filter_objectclasses``
when ``ipapermtargetfilter`` is set. Group and user objects now have a
``permission_filter_objectclasses_string`` attribute that is used
by new target filters.

Misc changes
------------

Also add new exception AlreadyContainsValueError. BaseLDAPAddAttribute
was raising a generic base class for LDAP execution errors.

Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/8326
Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1810160
Signed-off-by: Christian Heimes <cheimes@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
2020-06-15 22:44:42 +03:00
..
2019-02-05 08:39:13 -05:00
2020-06-15 22:44:42 +03:00
2020-04-16 14:01:03 +02:00
2018-04-20 09:43:37 +02:00

Ground rules on adding new schema

Brand new schema, particularly when written specifically for IPA, should be
added in share/*.ldif. Any new files need to be explicitly loaded in
ipaserver/install/dsinstance.py. These simply get copied directly into
the new instance schema directory.

Existing schema (e.g. in an LDAP draft) may either be added as a separate
ldif in share or as an update in the updates directory. The advantage of
adding the schema as an update is if 389-ds ever adds the schema then the
installation won't fail due to existing schema failing to load during
bootstrap.

If the new schema requires a new container then this should be added
to install/bootstrap-template.ldif.