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0e6d9edd5d
For a well-known anonymous principal an Anonymous PKINIT method is used which ignores the password set in the principal entry. For these principals any defined user auth type is irrelevant, their use is defined in RFC 6112. This gets confusing when a default user auth type requires a particular authentication method. When AS request for Anonymous PKINIT is used, a TGT would contain no authentication indicator. It means we cannot apply any specific indicator policy and must skip the checks. Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9165 Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com> Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <frenaud@redhat.com>
212 lines
7.2 KiB
C
212 lines
7.2 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (C) 2018,2020 FreeIPA Contributors see COPYING for license
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*/
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <syslog.h>
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#include <sys/random.h>
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#include <krb5/kdcpolicy_plugin.h>
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#include "ipa_krb5.h"
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#include "ipa_kdb.h"
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#define ONE_DAY_SECONDS (24 * 60 * 60)
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#define JITTER_WINDOW_SECONDS (1 * 60 * 60)
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krb5_error_code kdcpolicy_ipakdb_initvt(krb5_context context,
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int maj_ver, int min_ver,
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krb5_plugin_vtable vtable);
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static void
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jitter(krb5_deltat baseline, krb5_deltat *lifetime_out)
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{
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krb5_deltat offset;
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ssize_t ret;
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if (baseline < JITTER_WINDOW_SECONDS) {
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/* A negative value here would correspond to a never-valid ticket,
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* which isn't the goal. */
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*lifetime_out = baseline;
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return;
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}
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do {
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ret = getrandom(&offset, sizeof(offset), 0);
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} while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR);
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if (ret < 0) {
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krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "IPA kdcpolicy: getrandom failed (errno %d); skipping jitter...",
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errno);
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return;
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}
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*lifetime_out = baseline - abs(offset) % JITTER_WINDOW_SECONDS;
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}
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static krb5_error_code
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ipa_kdcpolicy_check_as(krb5_context context, krb5_kdcpolicy_moddata moddata,
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const krb5_kdc_req *request,
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const krb5_db_entry *client,
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const krb5_db_entry *server,
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const char *const *auth_indicators,
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const char **status, krb5_deltat *lifetime_out,
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krb5_deltat *renew_lifetime_out)
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{
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krb5_error_code kerr = 0;
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enum ipadb_user_auth ua;
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struct ipadb_e_data *ied;
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struct ipadb_e_pol_limits *pol_limits = NULL;
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int valid_auth_indicators = 0, flags = 0;
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krb5_db_entry *client_actual = NULL;
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#ifdef KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ALIAS_OK
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flags = KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ALIAS_OK;
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#endif
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*status = NULL;
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*lifetime_out = 0;
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*renew_lifetime_out = 0;
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ied = (struct ipadb_e_data *)client->e_data;
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if (ied == NULL || ied->magic != IPA_E_DATA_MAGIC) {
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/* e-data is not availble, getting user auth from LDAP */
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krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "IPA kdcpolicy: client e_data not availble. Try fetching...");
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kerr = ipadb_get_principal(context, request->client, flags,
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&client_actual);
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if (kerr != 0) {
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krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, "IPA kdcpolicy: ipadb_find_principal failed.");
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goto done;
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}
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ied = (struct ipadb_e_data *)client_actual->e_data;
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if (ied == NULL || ied->magic != IPA_E_DATA_MAGIC) {
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krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, "IPA kdcpolicy: client e_data fetching failed.");
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kerr = EINVAL;
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goto done;
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}
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}
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ua = ied->user_auth;
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/* If no mechanisms are set, or it is anonymous PKINIT, allow every auth method */
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if ((ua == IPADB_USER_AUTH_NONE) ||
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(request->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_REQUEST_ANONYMOUS)) {
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jitter(ONE_DAY_SECONDS, lifetime_out);
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kerr = 0;
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goto done;
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}
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/* For each auth indicator, see if it is allowed for that user */
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for (int i = 0; auth_indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
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const char *auth_indicator = auth_indicators[i];
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if (strcmp(auth_indicator, "otp") == 0) {
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valid_auth_indicators++;
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if (!(ua & IPADB_USER_AUTH_OTP)) {
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*status = "OTP pre-authentication not allowed for this user.";
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kerr = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
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goto done;
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}
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pol_limits = &(ied->pol_limits[IPADB_USER_AUTH_IDX_OTP]);
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} else if (strcmp(auth_indicator, "radius") == 0) {
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valid_auth_indicators++;
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if (!(ua & IPADB_USER_AUTH_RADIUS)) {
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*status = "OTP pre-authentication not allowed for this user.";
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kerr = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
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goto done;
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}
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pol_limits = &(ied->pol_limits[IPADB_USER_AUTH_IDX_RADIUS]);
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} else if (strcmp(auth_indicator, "pkinit") == 0) {
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valid_auth_indicators++;
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if (!(ua & IPADB_USER_AUTH_PKINIT)) {
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*status = "PKINIT pre-authentication not allowed for this user.";
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kerr = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
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goto done;
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}
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pol_limits = &(ied->pol_limits[IPADB_USER_AUTH_IDX_PKINIT]);
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} else if (strcmp(auth_indicator, "hardened") == 0) {
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valid_auth_indicators++;
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/* Allow hardened even if only password pre-auth is allowed */
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if (!(ua & (IPADB_USER_AUTH_HARDENED | IPADB_USER_AUTH_PASSWORD))) {
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*status = "Password pre-authentication not allowed for this user.";
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kerr = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
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goto done;
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}
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pol_limits = &(ied->pol_limits[IPADB_USER_AUTH_IDX_HARDENED]);
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} else if (strcmp(auth_indicator, "idp") == 0) {
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valid_auth_indicators++;
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/* Allow hardened even if only password pre-auth is allowed */
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if (!(ua & IPADB_USER_AUTH_IDP)) {
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*status = "IdP pre-authentication not allowed for this user.";
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kerr = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
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goto done;
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}
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pol_limits = &(ied->pol_limits[IPADB_USER_AUTH_IDX_IDP]);
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}
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}
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/* There is no auth indicator assigned for non-hardened password authentication
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* so we assume password is used when no supported indicator exists */
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if (!valid_auth_indicators) {
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if (!(ua & IPADB_USER_AUTH_PASSWORD)) {
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*status = "Non-hardened password authentication not allowed for this user.";
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kerr = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
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goto done;
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}
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}
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/* If there were policy limits associated with the authentication indicators,
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* apply them */
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if (pol_limits != NULL) {
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if (pol_limits->max_life != 0) {
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jitter(pol_limits->max_life, lifetime_out);
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} else {
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jitter(client->max_life, lifetime_out);
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}
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if (pol_limits->max_renewable_life != 0) {
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*renew_lifetime_out = pol_limits->max_renewable_life;
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}
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}
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done:
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ipadb_free_principal(context, client_actual);
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return kerr;
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}
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static krb5_error_code
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ipa_kdcpolicy_check_tgs(krb5_context context, krb5_kdcpolicy_moddata moddata,
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const krb5_kdc_req *request,
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const krb5_db_entry *server,
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const krb5_ticket *ticket,
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const char *const *auth_indicators,
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const char **status, krb5_deltat *lifetime_out,
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krb5_deltat *renew_lifetime_out)
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{
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*status = NULL;
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*lifetime_out = 0;
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*renew_lifetime_out = 0;
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return 0;
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}
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krb5_error_code kdcpolicy_ipakdb_initvt(krb5_context context,
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int maj_ver, int min_ver,
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krb5_plugin_vtable vtable)
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{
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krb5_kdcpolicy_vtable vt;
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if (maj_ver != 1)
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return KRB5_PLUGIN_VER_NOTSUPP;
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vt = (krb5_kdcpolicy_vtable)vtable;
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vt->name = "ipakdb";
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vt->init = NULL;
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vt->fini = NULL;
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vt->check_as = ipa_kdcpolicy_check_as;
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vt->check_tgs = ipa_kdcpolicy_check_tgs;
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return 0;
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}
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