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ae7cd4702d
Operations in FIPS mode make impossible use of NTLMSSP when authenticating to trusted Active Directory domain controllers because RC4 cipher is not allowed. Instead, Kerberos authentication have to be used. We switched to enforce Kerberos authentication when communicating with trusted domains' domain controllers everywhere. Kerberos library uses system wide configuration which in IPA defaults to resolving location of KDCs via DNS SRV records. Once trust is established, SSSD will populate a list of closest DCs and provide them through the KDC locator plugin. But at the time the trust is established performing DNS SRV-based discovery of Kerberos KDCs might fail due to multiple reasons. It might also succeed but point to a DC that doesn't know about the account we have to use to establish trust. One edge case is when DNS SRV record points to an unreachable DC, whether due to a firewall or a network topology limitations. In such case an administrator would pass --server <server> option to 'ipa trust-add' or 'ipa trust-fetch-domains' commands. 'ipa trust-fetch-domains' runs a helper via oddjobd. This helper was already modified to support --server option and generated custom krb5.conf overlay to pin to a specific AD DC. However, this configuration was removed as soon as we finished talking to AD DCs. With switch to always use Kebreros to authenticate in retrieval of the topology information, we have to use the overlay everywhere as well. Convert the code that generated the overlay file into a context that generates the overlay and sets environment. Reuse it in other trust-related places where this matters. Oddjob helper runs as root and can write to /run/ipa for the krb5.conf overlay. Server side of 'ipa trust-add' code calls into ipaserver/dcerpc.py and runs under ipaapi so can only write to /tmp. Since it is a part of the Apache instance, it uses private /tmp mounted on tmpfs. Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/8664 Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/8655 Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com> Reviewed-By: Christian Heimes <cheimes@redhat.com> Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
1898 lines
77 KiB
Python
1898 lines
77 KiB
Python
# Authors:
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# Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
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#
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# Copyright (C) 2011-2016 Red Hat
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# see file 'COPYING' for use and warranty information
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#
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# Portions (C) Andrew Tridgell, Andrew Bartlett
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#
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# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
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# (at your option) any later version.
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#
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# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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# GNU General Public License for more details.
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#
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# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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# Make sure we only run this module at the server where samba4-python
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# package is installed to avoid issues with unavailable modules
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from __future__ import absolute_import
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from contextlib import contextmanager
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import logging
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import re
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import time
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from ipalib import api, _
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from ipalib import errors
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from ipalib.constants import FQDN
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from ipapython import ipautil
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from ipapython.dn import DN
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from ipapython.dnsutil import query_srv
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from ipapython.ipaldap import ldap_initialize
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from ipaserver.dcerpc_common import (TRUST_BIDIRECTIONAL,
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TRUST_JOIN_EXTERNAL,
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trust_type_string)
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from ipalib.util import normalize_name
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import os
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import struct
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import random
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from samba import param
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from samba import credentials
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from samba.dcerpc import security, lsa, drsblobs, nbt, netlogon
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from samba.ndr import ndr_pack, ndr_print
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from samba import net
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from samba import ntstatus
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import samba
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try:
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from samba.trust_utils import CreateTrustedDomainRelax
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except ImportError:
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CreateTrustedDomainRelax = None
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try:
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from samba import arcfour_encrypt
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except ImportError:
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if CreateTrustedDomainRelax is None:
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raise ImportError("No supported Samba Python bindings")
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import ldap as _ldap
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from ipapython import ipaldap
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from ipapython.dnsutil import DNSName
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from dns.exception import DNSException
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import pysss_nss_idmap
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import pysss
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import six
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from ipaplatform.paths import paths
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from time import sleep
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try:
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from ldap.controls import RequestControl as LDAPControl
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except ImportError:
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from ldap.controls import LDAPControl
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if six.PY3:
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unicode = str
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long = int
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__doc__ = _("""
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Classes to manage trust joins using DCE-RPC calls
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The code in this module relies heavily on samba4-python package
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and Samba4 python bindings.
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""")
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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def is_sid_valid(sid):
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try:
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security.dom_sid(sid)
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except TypeError:
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return False
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else:
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return True
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access_denied_error = errors.ACIError(
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info=_('CIFS server denied your credentials'))
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dcerpc_error_codes = {
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-1073741823:
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errors.RemoteRetrieveError(
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reason=_('communication with CIFS server was unsuccessful')),
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-1073741790: access_denied_error,
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-1073741715: access_denied_error,
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-1073741614: access_denied_error,
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-1073741603:
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errors.ValidationError(
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name=_('AD domain controller'),
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error=_('unsupported functional level')),
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-1073741811: # NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER
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errors.RemoteRetrieveError(
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reason=_('AD domain controller complains about communication '
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'sequence. It may mean unsynchronized time on both '
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'sides, for example')),
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-1073741776: # NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX,
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# we simply will skip the binding
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access_denied_error,
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-1073741772: # NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
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errors.NotFound(
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reason=_('Cannot find specified domain or server name')),
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}
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dcerpc_error_messages = {
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"NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND":
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errors.NotFound(
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reason=_('Cannot find specified domain or server name')),
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"The object name is not found.":
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errors.NotFound(
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reason=_('Cannot find specified domain or server name')),
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"WERR_NO_LOGON_SERVERS":
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errors.RemoteRetrieveError(
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reason=_('AD DC was unable to reach any IPA domain controller. '
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'Most likely it is a DNS or firewall issue')),
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# This is a very long key, don't change it
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"There are currently no logon servers available to "
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"service the logon request.":
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errors.RemoteRetrieveError(
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reason=_('AD DC was unable to reach any IPA domain controller. '
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'Most likely it is a DNS or firewall issue')),
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"NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX":
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errors.RequirementError(
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name=_('At least the domain or IP address should be specified')),
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}
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pysss_type_key_translation_dict = {
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pysss_nss_idmap.ID_USER: 'user',
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pysss_nss_idmap.ID_GROUP: 'group',
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# Used for users with magic private groups
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pysss_nss_idmap.ID_BOTH: 'both',
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}
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class TrustTopologyConflictSolved(Exception):
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"""
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Internal trust error: raised when previously detected
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trust topology conflict is automatically solved.
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No separate errno is assigned as this error should
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not be visible outside the dcerpc.py code.
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"""
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def assess_dcerpc_error(error):
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"""
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Takes error returned by Samba bindings and converts it into
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an IPA error class.
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"""
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if isinstance(error, RuntimeError):
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error_tuple = error.args
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else:
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error_tuple = error
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if len(error_tuple) != 2:
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raise RuntimeError("Unable to parse error: {err!r}".format(err=error))
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num, message = error_tuple
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if num and num in dcerpc_error_codes:
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return dcerpc_error_codes[num]
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if message and message in dcerpc_error_messages:
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return dcerpc_error_messages[message]
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reason = _('CIFS server communication error: code "%(num)s", '
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'message "%(message)s" (both may be "None")') % \
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dict(num=num, message=message)
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return errors.RemoteRetrieveError(reason=reason)
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class ExtendedDNControl(LDAPControl):
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def __init__(self):
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LDAPControl.__init__(
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self,
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controlType="1.2.840.113556.1.4.529",
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criticality=False,
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encodedControlValue=b'0\x03\x02\x01\x01'
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)
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class DomainValidator:
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ATTR_FLATNAME = 'ipantflatname'
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ATTR_SID = 'ipantsecurityidentifier'
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ATTR_TRUSTED_SID = 'ipanttrusteddomainsid'
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ATTR_TRUST_PARTNER = 'ipanttrustpartner'
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ATTR_TRUST_AUTHOUT = 'ipanttrustauthoutgoing'
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def __init__(self, api):
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self.api = api
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self.ldap = self.api.Backend.ldap2
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self.domain = None
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self.flatname = None
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self.dn = None
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self.sid = None
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self._domains = None
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self._info = dict()
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self._creds = None
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self._admin_creds = None
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self._parm = None
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def is_configured(self):
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cn_trust_local = DN(('cn', self.api.env.domain),
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self.api.env.container_cifsdomains,
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self.api.env.basedn)
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try:
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entry_attrs = self.ldap.get_entry(cn_trust_local,
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[self.ATTR_FLATNAME,
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self.ATTR_SID])
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self.flatname = entry_attrs[self.ATTR_FLATNAME][0]
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self.sid = entry_attrs[self.ATTR_SID][0]
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self.dn = entry_attrs.dn
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self.domain = self.api.env.domain
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except errors.NotFound:
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return False
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return True
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def get_trusted_domains(self):
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"""
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Returns case-insensitive dict of trusted domain tuples
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(flatname, sid, trust_auth_outgoing), keyed by domain name.
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"""
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cn_trust = DN(('cn', 'ad'), self.api.env.container_trusts,
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self.api.env.basedn)
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try:
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search_kw = {'objectClass': 'ipaNTTrustedDomain'}
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filter = self.ldap.make_filter(search_kw,
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rules=self.ldap.MATCH_ALL)
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entries, _truncated = self.ldap.find_entries(
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filter=filter,
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base_dn=cn_trust,
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attrs_list=[self.ATTR_TRUSTED_SID,
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self.ATTR_FLATNAME,
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self.ATTR_TRUST_PARTNER]
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)
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# We need to use case-insensitive dictionary since we use
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# domain names as keys and those are generally case-insensitive
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result = ipautil.CIDict()
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for e in entries:
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try:
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t_partner = e.single_value.get(self.ATTR_TRUST_PARTNER)
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fname_norm = e.single_value.get(self.ATTR_FLATNAME).lower()
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trusted_sid = e.single_value.get(self.ATTR_TRUSTED_SID)
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except KeyError as exc:
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# Some piece of trusted domain info in LDAP is missing
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# Skip the domain, but leave log entry for investigation
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logger.warning("Trusted domain '%s' entry misses an "
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"attribute: %s", e.dn, exc)
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continue
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result[t_partner] = (fname_norm,
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security.dom_sid(trusted_sid))
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return result
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except errors.NotFound as exc:
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return []
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def set_trusted_domains(self):
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# At this point we have SID_NT_AUTHORITY family SID and really need to
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# check it against prefixes of domain SIDs we trust to
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if not self._domains:
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self._domains = self.get_trusted_domains()
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if len(self._domains) == 0:
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# Our domain is configured but no trusted domains are configured
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# This means we can't check the correctness of a trusted
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# domain SIDs
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raise errors.ValidationError(name='sid',
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error=_('no trusted domain '
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'is configured'))
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def get_domain_by_sid(self, sid, exact_match=False):
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if not self.domain:
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# our domain is not configured or self.is_configured() never run
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# reject SIDs as we can't check correctness of them
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raise errors.ValidationError(name='sid',
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error=_('domain is not configured'))
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# Parse sid string to see if it is really in a SID format
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try:
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test_sid = security.dom_sid(sid)
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except TypeError:
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raise errors.ValidationError(name='sid',
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error=_('SID is not valid'))
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# At this point we have SID_NT_AUTHORITY family SID and really need to
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# check it against prefixes of domain SIDs we trust to
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self.set_trusted_domains()
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# We have non-zero list of trusted domains and have to go through
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# them one by one and check their sids as prefixes / exact match
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# depending on the value of exact_match flag
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if exact_match:
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# check exact match of sids
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for domain in self._domains:
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if sid == str(self._domains[domain][1]):
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return domain
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raise errors.NotFound(reason=_("SID does not match exactly"
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"with any trusted domain's SID"))
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else:
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# check as prefixes
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test_sid_subauths = test_sid.sub_auths
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for domain in self._domains:
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domsid = self._domains[domain][1]
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sub_auths = domsid.sub_auths
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num_auths = min(test_sid.num_auths, domsid.num_auths)
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if test_sid_subauths[:num_auths] == sub_auths[:num_auths]:
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return domain
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raise errors.NotFound(reason=_('SID does not match any '
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'trusted domain'))
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def is_trusted_sid_valid(self, sid):
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try:
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self.get_domain_by_sid(sid)
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except (errors.ValidationError, errors.NotFound):
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return False
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else:
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return True
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def is_trusted_domain_sid_valid(self, sid):
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try:
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self.get_domain_by_sid(sid, exact_match=True)
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except (errors.ValidationError, errors.NotFound):
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return False
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else:
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return True
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def get_sid_from_domain_name(self, name):
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"""Returns binary representation of SID for the trusted domain name
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or None if name is not in the list of trusted domains."""
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domains = self.get_trusted_domains()
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if name in domains:
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return domains[name][1]
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else:
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return None
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def get_trusted_domain_objects(self, domain=None, flatname=None, filter="",
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attrs=None, scope=_ldap.SCOPE_SUBTREE,
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basedn=None):
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"""
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Search for LDAP objects in a trusted domain specified either by
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`domain' or `flatname'. The actual LDAP search is specified by
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`filter', `attrs', `scope' and `basedn'. When `basedn' is empty,
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database root DN is used.
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"""
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assert domain is not None or flatname is not None
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"""Returns SID for the trusted domain object (user or group only)"""
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if not self.domain:
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# our domain is not configured or self.is_configured() never run
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raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('Trust setup'),
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error=_('Our domain is '
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'not configured'))
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if not self._domains:
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self._domains = self.get_trusted_domains()
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if len(self._domains) == 0:
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# Our domain is configured but no trusted domains are configured
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raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('Trust setup'),
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error=_('No trusted domain is '
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'not configured'))
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entries = None
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if domain is not None:
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if domain not in self._domains:
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raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('trusted domain object'),
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error=_('domain is not trusted'))
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# Now we have a name to check against our list of trusted domains
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entries = self.search_in_dc(domain, filter, attrs, scope, basedn)
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elif flatname is not None:
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# Flatname was specified, traverse through the list of trusted
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# domains first to find the proper one
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found_flatname = False
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for domain in self._domains:
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if self._domains[domain][0] == flatname:
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found_flatname = True
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entries = self.search_in_dc(domain, filter,
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attrs, scope, basedn)
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if entries:
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break
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if not found_flatname:
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raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('trusted domain object'),
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error=_('no trusted domain '
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'matched the specified '
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'flat name'))
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if not entries:
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raise errors.NotFound(reason=_('trusted domain object not found'))
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return entries
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def get_trusted_domain_object_sid(self, object_name,
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fallback_to_ldap=True):
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result = pysss_nss_idmap.getsidbyname(object_name)
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if object_name in result and \
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(pysss_nss_idmap.SID_KEY in result[object_name]):
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object_sid = result[object_name][pysss_nss_idmap.SID_KEY]
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if self.is_trusted_sid_valid(object_sid):
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return object_sid
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else:
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raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('trusted domain object'),
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error=_('Object does not belong '
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'to a trusted domain'))
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|
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# If fallback to AD DC LDAP is not allowed, bail out
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if not fallback_to_ldap:
|
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raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('trusted domain object'),
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error=_('SSSD was unable to resolve '
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'the object to a valid SID'))
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# Else, we are going to contact AD DC LDAP
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components = normalize_name(object_name)
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if not ('domain' in components or 'flatname' in components):
|
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# No domain or realm specified, ambiguous search
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raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('trusted domain object'),
|
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error=_('Ambiguous search, user '
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'domain was not specified'))
|
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|
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attrs = ['objectSid']
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filter = '(&(sAMAccountName=%(name)s)' \
|
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'(|(objectClass=user)(objectClass=group)))' \
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% dict(name=components['name'])
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scope = _ldap.SCOPE_SUBTREE
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entries = self.get_trusted_domain_objects(components.get('domain'),
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components.get('flatname'),
|
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filter, attrs, scope)
|
|
|
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if len(entries) > 1:
|
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# Treat non-unique entries as invalid
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raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('trusted domain object'),
|
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error=_('Trusted domain did not '
|
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'return a unique object'))
|
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sid = self.__sid_to_str(entries[0]['objectSid'][0])
|
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try:
|
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test_sid = security.dom_sid(sid)
|
|
return unicode(test_sid)
|
|
except TypeError:
|
|
raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('trusted domain object'),
|
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error=_('Trusted domain did not '
|
|
'return a valid SID for '
|
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'the object'))
|
|
|
|
def get_trusted_domain_object_type(self, name_or_sid):
|
|
"""
|
|
Return the type of the object corresponding to the given name in
|
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the trusted domain, which is either 'user', 'group' or 'both'.
|
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The 'both' types is used for users with magic private groups.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
object_type = None
|
|
|
|
if is_sid_valid(name_or_sid):
|
|
result = pysss_nss_idmap.getnamebysid(name_or_sid)
|
|
else:
|
|
result = pysss_nss_idmap.getsidbyname(name_or_sid)
|
|
|
|
if name_or_sid in result:
|
|
object_type = result[name_or_sid].get(pysss_nss_idmap.TYPE_KEY)
|
|
|
|
# Do the translation to hide pysss_nss_idmap constants
|
|
# from higher-level code
|
|
return pysss_type_key_translation_dict.get(object_type)
|
|
|
|
def get_trusted_domain_object_from_sid(self, sid):
|
|
logger.debug("Converting SID to object name: %s", sid)
|
|
|
|
# Check if the given SID is valid
|
|
if not self.is_trusted_sid_valid(sid):
|
|
raise errors.ValidationError(name='sid', error='SID is not valid')
|
|
|
|
# Use pysss_nss_idmap to obtain the name
|
|
result = pysss_nss_idmap.getnamebysid(sid).get(sid)
|
|
|
|
valid_types = (pysss_nss_idmap.ID_USER,
|
|
pysss_nss_idmap.ID_GROUP,
|
|
pysss_nss_idmap.ID_BOTH)
|
|
|
|
if result:
|
|
if result.get(pysss_nss_idmap.TYPE_KEY) in valid_types:
|
|
return result.get(pysss_nss_idmap.NAME_KEY)
|
|
|
|
# If unsuccessful, search AD DC LDAP
|
|
logger.debug("Searching AD DC LDAP")
|
|
|
|
# escape_filter_chars(sid_bytes, 2) but for bytes
|
|
escaped_sid = "".join(
|
|
"\\%02x" % b for b in ndr_pack(security.dom_sid(sid))
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
attrs = ['sAMAccountName']
|
|
filter = (r'(&(objectSid=%(sid)s)'
|
|
'(|(objectClass=user)(objectClass=group)))'
|
|
% dict(sid=escaped_sid)) # sid in binary
|
|
domain = self.get_domain_by_sid(sid)
|
|
|
|
entries = self.get_trusted_domain_objects(domain=domain,
|
|
filter=filter,
|
|
attrs=attrs)
|
|
|
|
if len(entries) > 1:
|
|
# Treat non-unique entries as invalid
|
|
raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('trusted domain object'),
|
|
error=_('Trusted domain did not '
|
|
'return a unique object'))
|
|
|
|
object_name = (
|
|
"%s@%s" % (entries[0].single_value['sAMAccountName'].lower(),
|
|
domain.lower())
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
return unicode(object_name)
|
|
|
|
def __get_trusted_domain_user_and_groups(self, object_name):
|
|
"""
|
|
Returns a tuple with user SID and a list of SIDs of all groups he is
|
|
a member of.
|
|
|
|
LIMITATIONS:
|
|
- only Trusted Admins group members can use this function as it
|
|
uses secret for IPA-Trusted domain link
|
|
- List of group SIDs does not contain group memberships outside
|
|
of the trusted domain
|
|
"""
|
|
components = normalize_name(object_name)
|
|
domain = components.get('domain')
|
|
flatname = components.get('flatname')
|
|
name = components.get('name')
|
|
|
|
is_valid_sid = is_sid_valid(object_name)
|
|
if is_valid_sid:
|
|
# Find a trusted domain for the SID
|
|
domain = self.get_domain_by_sid(object_name)
|
|
# Now search a trusted domain for a user with this SID
|
|
attrs = ['cn']
|
|
filter = '(&(objectClass=user)(objectSid=%(sid)s))' \
|
|
% dict(sid=object_name)
|
|
try:
|
|
entries = self.get_trusted_domain_objects(domain=domain,
|
|
filter=filter,
|
|
attrs=attrs,
|
|
scope=_ldap.SCOPE_SUBTREE)
|
|
except errors.NotFound:
|
|
raise errors.NotFound(reason=_('trusted domain user not found'))
|
|
user_dn = entries[0].dn
|
|
elif domain or flatname:
|
|
attrs = ['cn']
|
|
filter = '(&(sAMAccountName=%(name)s)(objectClass=user))' \
|
|
% dict(name=name)
|
|
try:
|
|
entries = self.get_trusted_domain_objects(domain,
|
|
flatname, filter, attrs,
|
|
_ldap.SCOPE_SUBTREE)
|
|
except errors.NotFound:
|
|
raise errors.NotFound(reason=_('trusted domain user not found'))
|
|
user_dn = entries[0].dn
|
|
else:
|
|
# No domain or realm specified, ambiguous search
|
|
raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('trusted domain object'),
|
|
error=_('Ambiguous search, '
|
|
'user domain was not specified'))
|
|
|
|
# Get SIDs of user object and it's groups
|
|
# tokenGroups attribute must be read with a scope BASE for a known user
|
|
# distinguished name to avoid search error
|
|
attrs = ['objectSID', 'tokenGroups']
|
|
filter = "(objectClass=user)"
|
|
entries = self.get_trusted_domain_objects(domain,
|
|
flatname, filter, attrs,
|
|
_ldap.SCOPE_BASE, user_dn)
|
|
object_sid = self.__sid_to_str(entries[0]['objectSid'][0])
|
|
group_sids = [self.__sid_to_str(sid)
|
|
for sid in entries[0]['tokenGroups']]
|
|
return (object_sid, group_sids)
|
|
|
|
def get_trusted_domain_user_and_groups(self, object_name):
|
|
"""
|
|
Returns a tuple with user SID and a list of SIDs of all groups he is
|
|
a member of.
|
|
|
|
First attempts to perform SID lookup via SSSD and in case of failure
|
|
resorts back to checking trusted domain's AD DC LDAP directly.
|
|
|
|
LIMITATIONS:
|
|
- only Trusted Admins group members can use this function as it
|
|
uses secret for IPA-Trusted domain link if SSSD lookup failed
|
|
- List of group SIDs does not contain group memberships outside
|
|
of the trusted domain
|
|
"""
|
|
group_sids = None
|
|
group_list = None
|
|
object_sid = None
|
|
is_valid_sid = is_sid_valid(object_name)
|
|
if is_valid_sid:
|
|
object_sid = object_name
|
|
result = pysss_nss_idmap.getnamebysid(object_name)
|
|
if object_name in result and \
|
|
(pysss_nss_idmap.NAME_KEY in result[object_name]):
|
|
group_list = pysss.getgrouplist(
|
|
result[object_name][pysss_nss_idmap.NAME_KEY])
|
|
else:
|
|
result = pysss_nss_idmap.getsidbyname(object_name)
|
|
if object_name in result and \
|
|
(pysss_nss_idmap.SID_KEY in result[object_name]):
|
|
object_sid = result[object_name][pysss_nss_idmap.SID_KEY]
|
|
group_list = pysss.getgrouplist(object_name)
|
|
|
|
if not group_list:
|
|
return self.__get_trusted_domain_user_and_groups(object_name)
|
|
|
|
group_sids = pysss_nss_idmap.getsidbyname(group_list)
|
|
return (
|
|
object_sid,
|
|
[el[1][pysss_nss_idmap.SID_KEY] for el in group_sids.items()]
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
def __sid_to_str(self, sid):
|
|
"""
|
|
Converts binary SID to string representation
|
|
Returns unicode string
|
|
"""
|
|
sid_rev_num = ord(sid[0])
|
|
number_sub_id = ord(sid[1])
|
|
ia = struct.unpack('!Q', '\x00\x00'+sid[2:8])[0]
|
|
subs = [
|
|
struct.unpack('<I', sid[8+4*i:12+4*i])[0]
|
|
for i in range(number_sub_id)
|
|
]
|
|
return 'S-%d-%d-%s' % (sid_rev_num, ia,
|
|
'-'.join([str(s) for s in subs]),)
|
|
|
|
def kinit_as_administrator(self, domain):
|
|
"""
|
|
Initializes ccache with http service credentials.
|
|
|
|
Applies session code defaults for ccache directory and naming prefix.
|
|
Session code uses kinit_+<pid>, we use
|
|
kinit_+<TD>+<domain netbios name> so there is no clash.
|
|
|
|
Returns tuple (ccache path, principal) where (None, None) signifes an
|
|
error on ccache initialization
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
if self._admin_creds is None:
|
|
return (None, None)
|
|
|
|
domain_suffix = domain.replace('.', '-')
|
|
|
|
ccache_name = "kinit_TDA%s" % (domain_suffix)
|
|
ccache_path = os.path.join(paths.IPA_CCACHES, ccache_name)
|
|
|
|
(principal, password) = self._admin_creds.split('%', 1)
|
|
|
|
# Destroy the contents of the ccache
|
|
logger.debug('Destroying the contents of the separate ccache')
|
|
|
|
ipautil.run(
|
|
[paths.KDESTROY, '-A', '-c', ccache_path],
|
|
env={'KRB5CCNAME': ccache_path},
|
|
raiseonerr=False)
|
|
|
|
# Destroy the contents of the ccache
|
|
logger.debug('Running kinit with credentials of AD administrator')
|
|
|
|
result = ipautil.run(
|
|
[paths.KINIT, principal],
|
|
env={'KRB5CCNAME': ccache_path},
|
|
stdin=password,
|
|
raiseonerr=False)
|
|
|
|
if result.returncode == 0:
|
|
return (ccache_path, principal)
|
|
else:
|
|
return (None, None)
|
|
|
|
def search_in_dc(self, domain, filter, attrs, scope, basedn=None,
|
|
quiet=False):
|
|
"""
|
|
Perform LDAP search in a trusted domain `domain' Domain Controller.
|
|
Returns resulting entries or None.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
entries = None
|
|
|
|
info = self.__retrieve_trusted_domain_gc_list(domain)
|
|
|
|
if not info:
|
|
raise errors.ValidationError(
|
|
name=_('Trust setup'),
|
|
error=_('Cannot retrieve trusted domain GC list'))
|
|
|
|
for (host, port) in info['gc']:
|
|
entries = self.__search_in_dc(info, host, port, filter, attrs,
|
|
scope, basedn=basedn,
|
|
quiet=quiet)
|
|
if entries:
|
|
break
|
|
|
|
return entries
|
|
|
|
def __search_in_dc(self, info, host, port, filter, attrs, scope,
|
|
basedn=None, quiet=False):
|
|
"""
|
|
Actual search in AD LDAP server, using SASL GSSAPI authentication
|
|
Returns LDAP result or None.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
ccache_name = None
|
|
|
|
if self._admin_creds:
|
|
(ccache_name,
|
|
_principal) = self.kinit_as_administrator(info['dns_domain'])
|
|
|
|
if ccache_name:
|
|
with ipautil.private_ccache(path=ccache_name):
|
|
entries = None
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
# AD does not support SASL + TLS at the same time
|
|
# https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc223500.aspx
|
|
conn = ipaldap.LDAPClient.from_hostname_plain(
|
|
host,
|
|
no_schema=True,
|
|
decode_attrs=False
|
|
)
|
|
conn.gssapi_bind()
|
|
|
|
if basedn is None:
|
|
# Use domain root base DN
|
|
basedn = ipautil.realm_to_suffix(info['dns_domain'])
|
|
|
|
entries = conn.get_entries(basedn, scope, filter, attrs)
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
msg = "Search on AD DC {host}:{port} failed with: {err}"\
|
|
.format(host=host, port=str(port), err=str(e))
|
|
if quiet:
|
|
logger.debug('%s', msg)
|
|
else:
|
|
logger.warning('%s', msg)
|
|
|
|
return entries
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
def __retrieve_trusted_domain_gc_list(self, domain):
|
|
"""
|
|
Retrieves domain information and preferred GC list
|
|
Returns dictionary with following keys
|
|
name -- NetBIOS name of the trusted domain
|
|
dns_domain -- DNS name of the trusted domain
|
|
gc -- array of tuples (server, port) for Global Catalog
|
|
"""
|
|
if domain in self._info:
|
|
return self._info[domain]
|
|
|
|
if not self._creds:
|
|
self._parm = param.LoadParm()
|
|
self._parm.load(
|
|
os.path.join(paths.USR_SHARE_IPA_DIR, "smb.conf.empty"))
|
|
self._parm.set('netbios name', self.flatname)
|
|
self._creds = credentials.Credentials()
|
|
self._creds.set_kerberos_state(credentials.MUST_USE_KERBEROS)
|
|
self._creds.guess(self._parm)
|
|
self._creds.set_workstation(self.flatname)
|
|
|
|
netrc = net.Net(creds=self._creds, lp=self._parm)
|
|
finddc_error = None
|
|
result = None
|
|
flags = nbt.NBT_SERVER_LDAP | nbt.NBT_SERVER_GC | nbt.NBT_SERVER_CLOSEST
|
|
try:
|
|
result = netrc.finddc(domain=domain, flags=flags)
|
|
except RuntimeError as e:
|
|
try:
|
|
# If search of closest GC failed, attempt to find any one
|
|
flags = nbt.NBT_SERVER_LDAP | nbt.NBT_SERVER_GC
|
|
result = netrc.finddc(domain=domain, flags=flags)
|
|
except RuntimeError as e:
|
|
finddc_error = e
|
|
|
|
if not self._domains:
|
|
self._domains = self.get_trusted_domains()
|
|
|
|
info = dict()
|
|
servers = []
|
|
|
|
if result:
|
|
info['name'] = unicode(result.domain_name)
|
|
info['dns_domain'] = unicode(result.dns_domain)
|
|
servers = [(unicode(result.pdc_dns_name), 3268)]
|
|
else:
|
|
info['name'] = self._domains[domain]
|
|
info['dns_domain'] = domain
|
|
# Retrieve GC servers list
|
|
gc_name = '_gc._tcp.%s.' % info['dns_domain']
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
answers = query_srv(gc_name)
|
|
except DNSException as e:
|
|
answers = []
|
|
|
|
for answer in answers:
|
|
server = str(answer.target).rstrip(".")
|
|
servers.append((server, answer.port))
|
|
|
|
info['gc'] = servers
|
|
|
|
# Both methods should not fail at the same time
|
|
if finddc_error and len(info['gc']) == 0:
|
|
raise assess_dcerpc_error(finddc_error)
|
|
|
|
self._info[domain] = info
|
|
return info
|
|
|
|
|
|
def string_to_array(what):
|
|
if six.PY3 and isinstance(what, bytes):
|
|
return list(what)
|
|
return [ord(v) for v in what]
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TrustDomainInstance:
|
|
|
|
def __init__(self, hostname, creds=None):
|
|
self.parm = param.LoadParm()
|
|
self.parm.load(os.path.join(paths.USR_SHARE_IPA_DIR, "smb.conf.empty"))
|
|
if len(hostname) > 0:
|
|
self.parm.set('netbios name', hostname)
|
|
self.creds = creds
|
|
self.hostname = hostname
|
|
self.info = {}
|
|
self._pipe = None
|
|
self._policy_handle = None
|
|
self.read_only = False
|
|
self.ftinfo_records = None
|
|
self.ftinfo_data = None
|
|
self.validation_attempts = 0
|
|
|
|
def __gen_lsa_connection(self, binding):
|
|
if self.creds is None:
|
|
raise errors.RequirementError(name=_('CIFS credentials object'))
|
|
try:
|
|
result = lsa.lsarpc(binding, self.parm, self.creds)
|
|
return result
|
|
except RuntimeError as e:
|
|
raise assess_dcerpc_error(e)
|
|
|
|
def init_lsa_pipe(self, remote_host):
|
|
"""
|
|
Try to initialize connection to the LSA pipe at remote host.
|
|
This method tries consequently all possible transport options
|
|
and selects one that works. See __gen_lsa_bindings() for details.
|
|
|
|
The actual result may depend on details of existing credentials.
|
|
For example, using signing causes NO_SESSION_KEY with Win2K8 and
|
|
using kerberos against Samba with signing does not work.
|
|
"""
|
|
# short-cut: if LSA pipe is initialized, skip completely
|
|
if self._pipe:
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
attempts = 0
|
|
session_attempts = 0
|
|
bindings = self.__gen_lsa_bindings(remote_host)
|
|
for binding in bindings:
|
|
try:
|
|
self._pipe = self.__gen_lsa_connection(binding)
|
|
if self._pipe and self._pipe.session_key:
|
|
break
|
|
except errors.ACIError:
|
|
attempts = attempts + 1
|
|
except RuntimeError:
|
|
# When session key is not available, we just skip this binding
|
|
session_attempts = session_attempts + 1
|
|
|
|
if self._pipe is None and \
|
|
(attempts + session_attempts) == len(bindings):
|
|
raise errors.ACIError(
|
|
info=_('CIFS server %(host)s denied your credentials')
|
|
% dict(host=remote_host))
|
|
|
|
if self._pipe is None:
|
|
raise errors.RemoteRetrieveError(
|
|
reason=_('Cannot establish LSA connection to %(host)s. '
|
|
'Is CIFS server running?') % dict(host=remote_host))
|
|
self.binding = binding
|
|
self.session_key = self._pipe.session_key
|
|
|
|
def __gen_lsa_bindings(self, remote_host):
|
|
"""
|
|
There are multiple transports to issue LSA calls. However, depending on
|
|
a system in use they may be blocked by local operating system policies.
|
|
Generate all we can use. init_lsa_pipe() will try them one by one until
|
|
there is one working.
|
|
|
|
We try NCACN_NP before NCACN_IP_TCP and use SMB2 before SMB1.
|
|
"""
|
|
transports = ('ncacn_np', 'ncacn_ip_tcp')
|
|
options = ('smb2,print', 'print')
|
|
return ['%s:%s[%s]' % (t, remote_host, o)
|
|
for t in transports for o in options]
|
|
|
|
def retrieve_anonymously(self, remote_host,
|
|
discover_srv=False, search_pdc=False):
|
|
"""
|
|
When retrieving DC information anonymously, we can't get SID of the domain
|
|
"""
|
|
netrc = net.Net(creds=self.creds, lp=self.parm)
|
|
flags = nbt.NBT_SERVER_LDAP | nbt.NBT_SERVER_DS | nbt.NBT_SERVER_WRITABLE
|
|
if search_pdc:
|
|
flags = flags | nbt.NBT_SERVER_PDC
|
|
try:
|
|
if discover_srv:
|
|
result = netrc.finddc(domain=remote_host, flags=flags)
|
|
else:
|
|
result = netrc.finddc(address=remote_host, flags=flags)
|
|
except RuntimeError as e:
|
|
raise assess_dcerpc_error(e)
|
|
|
|
if not result:
|
|
return False
|
|
self.info['name'] = unicode(result.domain_name)
|
|
self.info['dns_domain'] = unicode(result.dns_domain)
|
|
self.info['dns_forest'] = unicode(result.forest)
|
|
self.info['guid'] = unicode(result.domain_uuid)
|
|
self.info['dc'] = unicode(result.pdc_dns_name)
|
|
self.info['is_pdc'] = (result.server_type & nbt.NBT_SERVER_PDC) != 0
|
|
|
|
# Netlogon response doesn't contain SID of the domain.
|
|
# We need to do rootDSE search with LDAP_SERVER_EXTENDED_DN_OID
|
|
# control to reveal the SID
|
|
ldap_uri = 'ldap://%s' % (result.pdc_dns_name)
|
|
conn = ldap_initialize(ldap_uri)
|
|
conn.set_option(_ldap.OPT_SERVER_CONTROLS, [ExtendedDNControl()])
|
|
search_result = None
|
|
try:
|
|
_objtype, res = conn.search_s('', _ldap.SCOPE_BASE)[0]
|
|
for o in res.keys():
|
|
if isinstance(res[o], list):
|
|
t = res[o]
|
|
for z, v in enumerate(t):
|
|
if isinstance(v, bytes):
|
|
t[z] = v.decode('utf-8')
|
|
elif isinstance(res[o], bytes):
|
|
res[o] = res[o].decode('utf-8')
|
|
search_result = res['defaultNamingContext'][0]
|
|
self.info['dns_hostname'] = res['dnsHostName'][0]
|
|
except _ldap.LDAPError as e:
|
|
logger.error(
|
|
"LDAP error when connecting to %s: %s",
|
|
unicode(result.pdc_name), str(e))
|
|
except KeyError as e:
|
|
logger.error("KeyError: %s, LDAP entry from %s "
|
|
"returned malformed. Your DNS might be "
|
|
"misconfigured.",
|
|
unicode(e),
|
|
unicode(result.pdc_name))
|
|
|
|
if search_result:
|
|
self.info['sid'] = self.parse_naming_context(search_result)
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
def parse_naming_context(self, context):
|
|
naming_ref = re.compile('.*<SID=(S-.*)>.*')
|
|
return unicode(naming_ref.match(context).group(1))
|
|
|
|
def retrieve(self, remote_host):
|
|
self.init_lsa_pipe(remote_host)
|
|
|
|
objectAttribute = lsa.ObjectAttribute()
|
|
objectAttribute.sec_qos = lsa.QosInfo()
|
|
try:
|
|
self._policy_handle = \
|
|
self._pipe.OpenPolicy2("", objectAttribute,
|
|
security.SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED)
|
|
result = self._pipe.QueryInfoPolicy2(self._policy_handle,
|
|
lsa.LSA_POLICY_INFO_DNS)
|
|
except RuntimeError as e:
|
|
raise assess_dcerpc_error(e)
|
|
|
|
self.info['name'] = unicode(result.name.string)
|
|
self.info['dns_domain'] = unicode(result.dns_domain.string)
|
|
self.info['dns_forest'] = unicode(result.dns_forest.string)
|
|
self.info['guid'] = unicode(result.domain_guid)
|
|
self.info['sid'] = unicode(result.sid)
|
|
self.info['dc'] = remote_host
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
result = self._pipe.QueryInfoPolicy2(self._policy_handle,
|
|
lsa.LSA_POLICY_INFO_ROLE)
|
|
except RuntimeError as e:
|
|
raise assess_dcerpc_error(e)
|
|
|
|
self.info['is_pdc'] = (result.role == lsa.LSA_ROLE_PRIMARY)
|
|
|
|
if all([self.info['is_pdc'],
|
|
self.info['dns_domain'] == self.info['dns_forest']]):
|
|
try:
|
|
netr_pipe = netlogon.netlogon(self.binding,
|
|
self.parm, self.creds)
|
|
self.ftinfo_data = netr_pipe.netr_DsRGetForestTrustInformation(
|
|
self.info['dc'], None, 0)
|
|
except RuntimeError as e:
|
|
raise assess_dcerpc_error(e)
|
|
|
|
def generate_auth(self, trustdom_secret):
|
|
password_blob = string_to_array(trustdom_secret.encode('utf-16-le'))
|
|
|
|
clear_value = drsblobs.AuthInfoClear()
|
|
clear_value.size = len(password_blob)
|
|
clear_value.password = password_blob
|
|
|
|
clear_authinfo = drsblobs.AuthenticationInformation()
|
|
clear_authinfo.LastUpdateTime = samba.unix2nttime(int(time.time()))
|
|
clear_authinfo.AuthType = lsa.TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR
|
|
clear_authinfo.AuthInfo = clear_value
|
|
|
|
authinfo_array = drsblobs.AuthenticationInformationArray()
|
|
authinfo_array.count = 1
|
|
authinfo_array.array = [clear_authinfo]
|
|
|
|
outgoing = drsblobs.trustAuthInOutBlob()
|
|
outgoing.count = 1
|
|
outgoing.current = authinfo_array
|
|
self.auth_inoutblob = outgoing
|
|
|
|
if CreateTrustedDomainRelax is None:
|
|
# Samba Python bindings with no support for FIPS wrapper
|
|
# We have to generate AuthInfo ourselves which means
|
|
# we have to use RC4 encryption directly
|
|
confounder = [3] * 512
|
|
for i in range(512):
|
|
confounder[i] = random.randint(0, 255)
|
|
|
|
trustpass = drsblobs.trustDomainPasswords()
|
|
trustpass.confounder = confounder
|
|
|
|
trustpass.outgoing = outgoing
|
|
trustpass.incoming = outgoing
|
|
|
|
trustpass_blob = ndr_pack(trustpass)
|
|
|
|
encrypted_trustpass = arcfour_encrypt(self._pipe.session_key,
|
|
trustpass_blob)
|
|
|
|
auth_blob = lsa.DATA_BUF2()
|
|
auth_blob.size = len(encrypted_trustpass)
|
|
auth_blob.data = string_to_array(encrypted_trustpass)
|
|
|
|
auth_info = lsa.TrustDomainInfoAuthInfoInternal()
|
|
auth_info.auth_blob = auth_blob
|
|
self.auth_info = auth_info
|
|
|
|
def generate_ftinfo(self, another_domain):
|
|
"""
|
|
Generates TrustDomainInfoFullInfo2Internal structure
|
|
This structure allows to pass information about all domains associated
|
|
with the another domain's realm.
|
|
|
|
Only top level name and top level name exclusions are handled here.
|
|
"""
|
|
if another_domain.ftinfo_data is not None:
|
|
return another_domain.ftinfo_data
|
|
|
|
if not another_domain.ftinfo_records:
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
ftinfo_records = []
|
|
info = lsa.ForestTrustInformation()
|
|
|
|
for rec in another_domain.ftinfo_records:
|
|
record = lsa.ForestTrustRecord()
|
|
record.flags = 0
|
|
record.time = rec['rec_time']
|
|
record.type = rec['rec_type']
|
|
record.forest_trust_data.string = rec['rec_name']
|
|
ftinfo_records.append(record)
|
|
|
|
info.count = len(ftinfo_records)
|
|
info.entries = ftinfo_records
|
|
return info
|
|
|
|
def clear_ftinfo_conflict(self, another_domain, cinfo):
|
|
"""
|
|
Attempt to clean up the forest trust collisions
|
|
|
|
:param self: the forest we establish trust to
|
|
:param another_domain: a forest that establishes trust to 'self'
|
|
:param cinfo: lsa_ForestTrustCollisionInfo structure that contain
|
|
set of of lsa_ForestTrustCollisionRecord structures
|
|
:raises: TrustTopologyConflictSolved, TrustTopologyConflictError
|
|
|
|
This code tries to perform intelligent job of going
|
|
over individual collisions and making exclusion entries
|
|
for affected IPA namespaces.
|
|
|
|
There are three possible conflict configurations:
|
|
- conflict of DNS namespace (TLN conflict, LSA_TLN_DISABLED_CONFLICT)
|
|
- conflict of SID namespace (LSA_SID_DISABLED_CONFLICT)
|
|
- conflict of NetBIOS namespace (LSA_NB_DISABLED_CONFLICT)
|
|
|
|
we only can handle TLN conflicts because (a) excluding SID namespace
|
|
is not possible and (b) excluding NetBIOS namespace not possible.
|
|
These two types of conflicts should result in trust-add CLI error
|
|
|
|
These conflicts can come from external source (another forest) or
|
|
from internal source (another domain in the same forest). We only
|
|
can fix the problems with another forest.
|
|
|
|
To resolve TLN conflict we need to do following:
|
|
1. Retrieve forest trust information for the forest we conflict on
|
|
2. Add an exclusion entry for IPA DNS namespace to it
|
|
3. Set forest trust information for the forest we conflict on
|
|
4. Re-try establishing trust to the original forest
|
|
|
|
This all can only be done under privileges of Active Directory admin
|
|
that can change forest trusts. If we cannot have those privileges,
|
|
the work has to be done manually in the Windows UI for
|
|
'Active Directory Domains and Trusts' by the administrator of the
|
|
original forest.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
def domain_name_from_ftinfo(ftinfo):
|
|
"""
|
|
Returns a domain name string from a ForestTrustRecord
|
|
|
|
:param ftinfo: LSA ForestTrustRecord to parse
|
|
"""
|
|
if ftinfo.type == lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO:
|
|
return ftinfo.forest_trust_data.dns_domain_name.string
|
|
elif ftinfo.type == lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_TOP_LEVEL_NAME:
|
|
return ftinfo.forest_trust_data.string
|
|
elif ftinfo.type == lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_TOP_LEVEL_NAME_EX:
|
|
# We should ignore TLN exclusion record because it
|
|
# is already an exclusion so we aren't going to
|
|
# change anything here
|
|
return None
|
|
else:
|
|
# Ignore binary blobs we don't know about
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
# List of entries for unsolved conflicts
|
|
result = []
|
|
|
|
trust_timestamp = long(time.time()*1e7+116444736000000000)
|
|
|
|
# Collision information contains entries for specific trusted domains
|
|
# we collide with. Look into TLN collisions and add a TLN exclusion
|
|
# entry to the specific domain trust.
|
|
logger.error("Attempt to solve forest trust topology conflicts")
|
|
for rec in cinfo.entries:
|
|
if rec.type == lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_TDO:
|
|
dominfo = self._pipe.lsaRQueryForestTrustInformation(
|
|
self._policy_handle,
|
|
rec.name,
|
|
lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO)
|
|
|
|
# Oops, we were unable to retrieve trust topology for this
|
|
# trusted domain (forest).
|
|
if not dominfo:
|
|
result.append(rec)
|
|
logger.error("Unable to resolve conflict for "
|
|
"DNS domain %s in the forest %s "
|
|
"for domain trust %s. Trust cannot "
|
|
"be established unless this conflict "
|
|
"is fixed manually.",
|
|
another_domain.info['dns_domain'],
|
|
self.info['dns_domain'],
|
|
rec.name.string)
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
# Copy over the entries, extend with TLN exclusion
|
|
entries = []
|
|
is_our_record = False
|
|
for e in dominfo.entries:
|
|
e1 = lsa.ForestTrustRecord()
|
|
e1.type = e.type
|
|
e1.flags = e.flags
|
|
e1.time = e.time
|
|
e1.forest_trust_data = e.forest_trust_data
|
|
|
|
# We either have a domain struct, a TLN name,
|
|
# or a TLN exclusion name in the list.
|
|
# The rest we should skip, those are binary blobs
|
|
dns_domain_name = domain_name_from_ftinfo(e)
|
|
|
|
# Search for a match in the topology of another domain
|
|
# if there is a match, we have to convert a record
|
|
# into a TLN exclusion to allow its routing to the
|
|
# another domain
|
|
for r in another_domain.ftinfo_records:
|
|
# r['rec_name'] cannot be None, thus we can ignore
|
|
# the case when dns_domain_name is None
|
|
if r['rec_name'] == dns_domain_name:
|
|
is_our_record = True
|
|
|
|
# Convert e1 into an exclusion record
|
|
e1.type = lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_TOP_LEVEL_NAME_EX
|
|
e1.flags = 0
|
|
e1.time = trust_timestamp
|
|
e1.forest_trust_data.string = dns_domain_name
|
|
break
|
|
entries.append(e1)
|
|
|
|
# If no candidate for the exclusion entry was found
|
|
# make sure it is the other domain itself, this covers
|
|
# a most common case
|
|
if not is_our_record:
|
|
# Create TLN exclusion record for the top level domain
|
|
record = lsa.ForestTrustRecord()
|
|
record.type = lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_TOP_LEVEL_NAME_EX
|
|
record.flags = 0
|
|
record.time = trust_timestamp
|
|
record.forest_trust_data.string = \
|
|
another_domain.info['dns_domain']
|
|
entries.append(record)
|
|
|
|
fti = lsa.ForestTrustInformation()
|
|
fti.count = len(entries)
|
|
fti.entries = entries
|
|
|
|
# Update the forest trust information now
|
|
ldname = lsa.StringLarge()
|
|
ldname.string = rec.name.string
|
|
cninfo = None
|
|
try:
|
|
cninfo = self._pipe.lsaRSetForestTrustInformation(
|
|
self._policy_handle,
|
|
ldname,
|
|
lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO,
|
|
fti, 0)
|
|
except samba.NTSTATUSError as error:
|
|
# Handle NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER separately
|
|
if ntstatus.NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER == error.args[0]:
|
|
result.append(rec)
|
|
logger.error("Unable to resolve conflict for "
|
|
"DNS domain %s in the forest %s "
|
|
"for in-forest domain %s. Trust cannot "
|
|
"be established unless this conflict "
|
|
"is fixed manually.",
|
|
another_domain.info['dns_domain'],
|
|
self.info['dns_domain'],
|
|
rec.name.string)
|
|
else:
|
|
raise assess_dcerpc_error(error)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if cninfo:
|
|
result.append(rec)
|
|
logger.error("When defining exception for DNS "
|
|
"domain %s in forest %s for "
|
|
"trusted forest %s, "
|
|
"got collision info back:\n%s",
|
|
another_domain.info['dns_domain'],
|
|
self.info['dns_domain'],
|
|
rec.name.string,
|
|
ndr_print(cninfo))
|
|
else:
|
|
result.append(rec)
|
|
logger.error("Unable to resolve conflict for "
|
|
"DNS domain %s in the forest %s "
|
|
"for in-forest domain %s. Trust cannot "
|
|
"be established unless this conflict "
|
|
"is fixed manually.",
|
|
another_domain.info['dns_domain'],
|
|
self.info['dns_domain'],
|
|
rec.name.string)
|
|
|
|
if len(result) == 0:
|
|
logger.error("Successfully solved all conflicts")
|
|
raise TrustTopologyConflictSolved()
|
|
|
|
# Otherwise, raise TrustTopologyConflictError() exception
|
|
domains = [x.name.string for x in result]
|
|
raise errors.TrustTopologyConflictError(
|
|
forest=self.info['dns_domain'],
|
|
conflict=another_domain.info['dns_domain'],
|
|
domains=domains)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def update_ftinfo(self, another_domain):
|
|
"""
|
|
Updates forest trust information in this forest corresponding
|
|
to the another domain's information.
|
|
"""
|
|
if another_domain.ftinfo_records:
|
|
ftinfo = self.generate_ftinfo(another_domain)
|
|
# Set forest trust information -- we do it only against AD DC as
|
|
# smbd already has the information about itself
|
|
ldname = lsa.StringLarge()
|
|
ldname.string = another_domain.info['dns_domain']
|
|
ftlevel = lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO
|
|
# RSetForestTrustInformation returns collision information
|
|
# for trust topology
|
|
cinfo = self._pipe.lsaRSetForestTrustInformation(
|
|
self._policy_handle,
|
|
ldname,
|
|
ftlevel,
|
|
ftinfo, 0)
|
|
if cinfo:
|
|
logger.error("When setting forest trust information, "
|
|
"got collision info back:\n%s",
|
|
ndr_print(cinfo))
|
|
self.clear_ftinfo_conflict(another_domain, cinfo)
|
|
|
|
def establish_trust(self, another_domain, trustdom_secret,
|
|
trust_type='bidirectional', trust_external=False):
|
|
"""
|
|
Establishes trust between our and another domain
|
|
Input: another_domain -- instance of TrustDomainInstance,
|
|
initialized with #retrieve call
|
|
trustdom_secret -- shared secred used for the trust
|
|
"""
|
|
if self.info['name'] == another_domain.info['name']:
|
|
# Check that NetBIOS names do not clash
|
|
raise errors.ValidationError(name='AD Trust Setup',
|
|
error=_('the IPA server and the '
|
|
'remote domain cannot share '
|
|
'the same NetBIOS name: %s')
|
|
% self.info['name'])
|
|
|
|
|
|
info = lsa.TrustDomainInfoInfoEx()
|
|
info.domain_name.string = another_domain.info['dns_domain']
|
|
info.netbios_name.string = another_domain.info['name']
|
|
info.sid = security.dom_sid(another_domain.info['sid'])
|
|
info.trust_direction = lsa.LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND
|
|
if trust_type == TRUST_BIDIRECTIONAL:
|
|
info.trust_direction |= lsa.LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
|
|
info.trust_type = lsa.LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL
|
|
info.trust_attributes = 0
|
|
if trust_external:
|
|
info.trust_attributes |= lsa.LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_NON_TRANSITIVE
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
dname = lsa.String()
|
|
dname.string = another_domain.info['dns_domain']
|
|
res = self._pipe.QueryTrustedDomainInfoByName(
|
|
self._policy_handle,
|
|
dname,
|
|
lsa.LSA_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO_FULL_INFO
|
|
)
|
|
if res.info_ex.trust_type != lsa.LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL:
|
|
msg = _('There is already a trust to {ipa_domain} with '
|
|
'unsupported type {trust_type}. Please remove '
|
|
'it manually on AD DC side.')
|
|
ttype = trust_type_string(
|
|
res.info_ex.trust_type, res.info_ex.trust_attributes
|
|
)
|
|
err = msg.format(
|
|
ipa_domain=another_domain.info['dns_domain'],
|
|
trust_type=ttype)
|
|
|
|
raise errors.ValidationError(
|
|
name=_('AD domain controller'),
|
|
error=err
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
self._pipe.DeleteTrustedDomain(self._policy_handle,
|
|
res.info_ex.sid)
|
|
except RuntimeError as e:
|
|
# pylint: disable=unbalanced-tuple-unpacking
|
|
num, _message = e.args
|
|
# pylint: enable=unbalanced-tuple-unpacking
|
|
# Ignore anything but access denied (NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED)
|
|
if num == -1073741790:
|
|
raise access_denied_error
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
self.generate_auth(trustdom_secret)
|
|
if CreateTrustedDomainRelax is not None:
|
|
trustdom_handle = CreateTrustedDomainRelax(
|
|
self._pipe, self._policy_handle, info,
|
|
security.SEC_STD_DELETE,
|
|
self.auth_inoutblob, self.auth_inoutblob)
|
|
else:
|
|
# Samba Python bindings with no support for FIPS wrapper
|
|
# We keep using older code
|
|
trustdom_handle = self._pipe.CreateTrustedDomainEx2(
|
|
self._policy_handle,
|
|
info, self.auth_info,
|
|
security.SEC_STD_DELETE)
|
|
except RuntimeError as e:
|
|
raise assess_dcerpc_error(e)
|
|
|
|
# We should use proper trustdom handle in order to modify the
|
|
# trust settings. Samba insists this has to be done with LSA
|
|
# OpenTrustedDomain* calls, it is not enough to have a handle
|
|
# returned by the CreateTrustedDomainEx2 call.
|
|
trustdom_handle = self._pipe.OpenTrustedDomainByName(
|
|
self._policy_handle,
|
|
dname,
|
|
security.SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED)
|
|
try:
|
|
infocls = lsa.TrustDomainInfoSupportedEncTypes()
|
|
infocls.enc_types = security.KERB_ENCTYPE_RC4_HMAC_MD5
|
|
infocls.enc_types |= security.KERB_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
|
|
infocls.enc_types |= security.KERB_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
|
|
self._pipe.SetInformationTrustedDomain(
|
|
trustdom_handle,
|
|
lsa.LSA_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPES,
|
|
infocls)
|
|
except RuntimeError as e:
|
|
# We can ignore the error here -- changing enctypes is for
|
|
# improved security but the trust will work with default values as
|
|
# well. In particular, the call may fail against Windows 2003
|
|
# server as that one doesn't support AES encryption types
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
if not trust_external:
|
|
try:
|
|
info = self._pipe.QueryTrustedDomainInfo(
|
|
trustdom_handle,
|
|
lsa.LSA_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO_INFO_EX)
|
|
info.trust_attributes |= lsa.LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE
|
|
self._pipe.SetInformationTrustedDomain(
|
|
trustdom_handle,
|
|
lsa.LSA_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO_INFO_EX, info)
|
|
except RuntimeError as e:
|
|
logger.error(
|
|
'unable to set trust transitivity status: %s', str(e))
|
|
|
|
# Updating forest trust info may fail
|
|
# If it failed due to topology conflict, it may be fixed automatically
|
|
# update_ftinfo() will through exceptions in that case
|
|
# Note that MS-LSAD 3.1.4.7.16 says:
|
|
# -------------------------
|
|
# The server MUST also make sure that the trust attributes associated
|
|
# with the trusted domain object referenced by the TrustedDomainName
|
|
# parameter has the TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE set.
|
|
# If the attribute is not present, the server MUST return
|
|
# STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER.
|
|
# -------------------------
|
|
# Thus, we must not update forest trust info for the external trust
|
|
if self.info['is_pdc'] and not trust_external:
|
|
self.update_ftinfo(another_domain)
|
|
|
|
def verify_trust(self, another_domain):
|
|
def retrieve_netlogon_info_2(logon_server, domain, function_code, data):
|
|
try:
|
|
netr_pipe = netlogon.netlogon(domain.binding,
|
|
domain.parm, domain.creds)
|
|
result = netr_pipe.netr_LogonControl2Ex(
|
|
logon_server=logon_server,
|
|
function_code=function_code,
|
|
level=2,
|
|
data=data)
|
|
return result
|
|
except RuntimeError as e:
|
|
raise assess_dcerpc_error(e)
|
|
|
|
result = retrieve_netlogon_info_2(None, self,
|
|
netlogon.NETLOGON_CONTROL_TC_VERIFY,
|
|
another_domain.info['dns_domain'])
|
|
|
|
if result and result.flags and netlogon.NETLOGON_VERIFY_STATUS_RETURNED:
|
|
if result.pdc_connection_status[0] != 0 and \
|
|
result.tc_connection_status[0] != 0:
|
|
if result.pdc_connection_status[1] == "WERR_ACCESS_DENIED":
|
|
# Most likely AD DC hit another IPA replica which
|
|
# yet has no trust secret replicated
|
|
|
|
# Sleep and repeat again
|
|
self.validation_attempts += 1
|
|
if self.validation_attempts < 10:
|
|
sleep(5)
|
|
return self.verify_trust(another_domain)
|
|
|
|
# If we get here, we already failed 10 times
|
|
srv_record_templates = (
|
|
'_ldap._tcp.%s',
|
|
'_ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.dc._msdcs.%s'
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
srv_records = ', '.join(
|
|
[srv_record % api.env.domain
|
|
for srv_record in srv_record_templates]
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
error_message = _(
|
|
'IPA master denied trust validation requests from AD '
|
|
'DC %(count)d times. Most likely AD DC contacted a '
|
|
'replica that has no trust information replicated '
|
|
'yet. Additionally, please check that AD DNS is able '
|
|
'to resolve %(records)s SRV records to the correct '
|
|
'IPA server.') % dict(count=self.validation_attempts,
|
|
records=srv_records)
|
|
|
|
raise errors.ACIError(info=error_message)
|
|
|
|
raise assess_dcerpc_error(result.pdc_connection_status)
|
|
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
|
|
@contextmanager
|
|
def discover_trust_instance(api, mydomain, trustdomain,
|
|
creds=None, server=None):
|
|
domain_validator = DomainValidator(api)
|
|
configured = domain_validator.is_configured()
|
|
if not configured:
|
|
yield None
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
td = TrustDomainInstance('')
|
|
td.parm.set('workgroup', mydomain)
|
|
cr = credentials.Credentials()
|
|
cr.set_kerberos_state(credentials.DONT_USE_KERBEROS)
|
|
cr.guess(td.parm)
|
|
cr.set_anonymous()
|
|
cr.set_workstation(domain_validator.flatname)
|
|
netrc = net.Net(creds=cr, lp=td.parm)
|
|
try:
|
|
if server:
|
|
result = netrc.finddc(address=server,
|
|
flags=nbt.NBT_SERVER_LDAP | nbt.NBT_SERVER_DS)
|
|
else:
|
|
result = netrc.finddc(domain=trustdomain,
|
|
flags=nbt.NBT_SERVER_LDAP | nbt.NBT_SERVER_DS)
|
|
except RuntimeError as e:
|
|
raise assess_dcerpc_error(e)
|
|
|
|
td.info['dc'] = unicode(result.pdc_dns_name)
|
|
td.info['name'] = unicode(result.dns_domain)
|
|
if type(creds) is bool:
|
|
# Rely on existing Kerberos credentials in the environment
|
|
td.creds = credentials.Credentials()
|
|
td.creds.set_kerberos_state(credentials.MUST_USE_KERBEROS)
|
|
enforce_smb_encryption(td.creds)
|
|
td.creds.guess(td.parm)
|
|
td.creds.set_workstation(domain_validator.flatname)
|
|
logger.error('environment: %s', str(os.environ))
|
|
yield td
|
|
else:
|
|
# Attempt to authenticate as HTTP/ipa.master and use cross-forest trust
|
|
# or as passed-in user in case of a one-way trust
|
|
domval = DomainValidator(api)
|
|
ccache_name = None
|
|
if creds:
|
|
domval._admin_creds = creds
|
|
ccache_name, _principal = domval.kinit_as_administrator(
|
|
trustdomain)
|
|
else:
|
|
raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('Credentials'),
|
|
error=_('Missing credentials for '
|
|
'cross-forest communication'))
|
|
td.creds = credentials.Credentials()
|
|
td.creds.set_kerberos_state(credentials.MUST_USE_KERBEROS)
|
|
enforce_smb_encryption(td.creds)
|
|
if ccache_name:
|
|
with ipautil.private_ccache(path=ccache_name):
|
|
td.creds.guess(td.parm)
|
|
td.creds.set_workstation(domain_validator.flatname)
|
|
yield td
|
|
|
|
|
|
def fetch_domains(api, mydomain, trustdomain, creds=None, server=None):
|
|
def communicate(td):
|
|
td.init_lsa_pipe(td.info['dc'])
|
|
netr_pipe = netlogon.netlogon(td.binding, td.parm, td.creds)
|
|
# Older FreeIPA versions used netr_DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts call
|
|
# but it doesn't provide information about non-domain UPNs associated
|
|
# with the forest, thus we have to use netr_DsRGetForestTrustInformation
|
|
domains = netr_pipe.netr_DsRGetForestTrustInformation(td.info['dc'],
|
|
None, 0)
|
|
return domains
|
|
|
|
domains = None
|
|
with discover_trust_instance(api, mydomain, trustdomain,
|
|
creds=creds, server=server) as td:
|
|
if td is None:
|
|
return None
|
|
if td.ftinfo_data is not None:
|
|
domains = td.ftinfo_data
|
|
else:
|
|
domains = communicate(td)
|
|
|
|
if domains is None:
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
result = {'domains': {}, 'suffixes': {}}
|
|
# netr_DsRGetForestTrustInformation returns two types of entries:
|
|
# domain information -- name, NetBIOS name, SID of the domain
|
|
# top level name info -- a name suffix associated with the forest
|
|
# We should ignore forest root name/name suffix as it is already part
|
|
# of trust information for IPA purposes and only add what's inside the forest
|
|
ftinfo_records = []
|
|
ftinfo = drsblobs.ForestTrustInfo()
|
|
for t in domains.entries:
|
|
record = drsblobs.ForestTrustInfoRecord()
|
|
record.flags = t.flags
|
|
record.timestamp = t.time
|
|
record.type = t.type
|
|
|
|
if t.type == lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO:
|
|
record.data.sid = t.forest_trust_data.domain_sid
|
|
record.data.dns_name.string = \
|
|
t.forest_trust_data.dns_domain_name.string
|
|
record.data.netbios_name.string = \
|
|
t.forest_trust_data.netbios_domain_name.string
|
|
|
|
tname = unicode(t.forest_trust_data.dns_domain_name.string)
|
|
if tname != trustdomain:
|
|
result['domains'][tname] = {
|
|
'cn': tname,
|
|
'ipantflatname': unicode(
|
|
t.forest_trust_data.netbios_domain_name.string),
|
|
'ipanttrusteddomainsid': unicode(
|
|
t.forest_trust_data.domain_sid)
|
|
}
|
|
elif t.type == lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_TOP_LEVEL_NAME:
|
|
record.data.string = t.forest_trust_data.string
|
|
|
|
tname = unicode(t.forest_trust_data.string)
|
|
if tname == trustdomain:
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
result['suffixes'][tname] = {'cn': tname}
|
|
elif t.type == lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_TOP_LEVEL_NAME_EX:
|
|
record.data.string = t.forest_trust_data.string
|
|
|
|
rc = drsblobs.ForestTrustInfoRecordArmor()
|
|
rc.record = record
|
|
ftinfo_records.append(rc)
|
|
|
|
ftinfo.count = len(ftinfo_records)
|
|
ftinfo.records = ftinfo_records
|
|
result['ftinfo_data'] = ndr_pack(ftinfo)
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
|
|
def enforce_smb_encryption(creds):
|
|
try:
|
|
creds.set_smb_encryption(credentials.SMB_ENCRYPTION_REQUIRED)
|
|
except AttributeError:
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
|
|
def retrieve_remote_domain(hostname, local_flatname,
|
|
realm, realm_server=None,
|
|
realm_admin=None, realm_passwd=None):
|
|
def get_instance(local_flatname):
|
|
# Fetch data from foreign domain using password only
|
|
rd = TrustDomainInstance('')
|
|
rd.parm.set('workgroup', local_flatname)
|
|
rd.creds = credentials.Credentials()
|
|
rd.creds.set_kerberos_state(credentials.DONT_USE_KERBEROS)
|
|
rd.creds.guess(rd.parm)
|
|
return rd
|
|
|
|
rd = get_instance(local_flatname)
|
|
rd.creds.set_anonymous()
|
|
rd.creds.set_workstation(hostname)
|
|
if realm_server is None:
|
|
rd.retrieve_anonymously(realm, discover_srv=True, search_pdc=True)
|
|
else:
|
|
rd.retrieve_anonymously(realm_server,
|
|
discover_srv=False, search_pdc=True)
|
|
rd.read_only = True
|
|
if realm_admin and realm_passwd:
|
|
if 'name' in rd.info:
|
|
realm_netbios = ""
|
|
names = realm_admin.split('\\')
|
|
if len(names) > 1:
|
|
# realm admin is in DOMAIN\user format
|
|
# strip DOMAIN part as we'll enforce the one discovered
|
|
realm_admin = names[-1]
|
|
realm_netbios = names[0]
|
|
names = realm_admin.split('@')
|
|
if len(names) == 1:
|
|
if all([len(realm_netbios) != 0,
|
|
realm_netbios.lower() != rd.info['name'].lower()]):
|
|
raise errors.ValidationError(
|
|
name=_('Credentials'),
|
|
error=_('Non-Kerberos user name was specified, '
|
|
'please provide user@REALM variant instead'))
|
|
realm_admin = r"%s@%s" % (
|
|
realm_admin, rd.info['dns_domain'].upper())
|
|
realm = rd.info['dns_domain'].upper()
|
|
auth_string = r"%s%%%s" \
|
|
% (realm_admin, realm_passwd)
|
|
with ipautil.private_krb5_config(realm, realm_server, dir='/tmp'):
|
|
with ipautil.private_ccache():
|
|
td = get_instance(local_flatname)
|
|
td.creds.set_kerberos_state(credentials.MUST_USE_KERBEROS)
|
|
enforce_smb_encryption(td.creds)
|
|
td.creds.parse_string(auth_string)
|
|
td.creds.set_workstation(hostname)
|
|
if realm_server is None:
|
|
# we must have rd.info['dns_hostname'] then
|
|
# as it is part of the anonymous discovery
|
|
td.retrieve(rd.info['dns_hostname'])
|
|
else:
|
|
td.retrieve(realm_server)
|
|
td.read_only = False
|
|
return td
|
|
|
|
# Otherwise, use anonymously obtained data
|
|
return rd
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TrustDomainJoins:
|
|
def __init__(self, api):
|
|
self.api = api
|
|
self.local_domain = None
|
|
self.remote_domain = None
|
|
self.__allow_behavior = 0
|
|
|
|
domain_validator = DomainValidator(api)
|
|
self.configured = domain_validator.is_configured()
|
|
|
|
if self.configured:
|
|
self.local_flatname = domain_validator.flatname
|
|
self.local_dn = domain_validator.dn
|
|
self.__populate_local_domain()
|
|
|
|
def allow_behavior(self, *flags):
|
|
for f in flags:
|
|
self.__allow_behavior |= int(f)
|
|
|
|
def __populate_local_domain(self):
|
|
# Initialize local domain info using kerberos only
|
|
ld = TrustDomainInstance(self.local_flatname)
|
|
ld.creds = credentials.Credentials()
|
|
ld.creds.set_kerberos_state(credentials.MUST_USE_KERBEROS)
|
|
enforce_smb_encryption(ld.creds)
|
|
ld.creds.guess(ld.parm)
|
|
ld.creds.set_workstation(ld.hostname)
|
|
ld.retrieve(FQDN)
|
|
self.local_domain = ld
|
|
|
|
def populate_remote_domain(self, realm, realm_server=None,
|
|
realm_admin=None, realm_passwd=None):
|
|
self.remote_domain = retrieve_remote_domain(
|
|
self.local_domain.hostname,
|
|
self.local_domain.info['name'],
|
|
realm,
|
|
realm_server=realm_server,
|
|
realm_admin=realm_admin,
|
|
realm_passwd=realm_passwd)
|
|
|
|
def get_realmdomains(self):
|
|
"""
|
|
Generate list of records for forest trust information about
|
|
our realm domains. Note that the list generated currently
|
|
includes only top level domains, no exclusion domains, and
|
|
no TDO objects as we handle the latter in a separate way
|
|
"""
|
|
if self.local_domain.read_only:
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
self.local_domain.ftinfo_records = []
|
|
|
|
realm_domains = self.api.Command.realmdomains_show()['result']
|
|
# Use realmdomains' modification timestamp
|
|
# to judge records' last update time
|
|
entry = self.api.Backend.ldap2.get_entry(
|
|
realm_domains['dn'], ['modifyTimestamp'])
|
|
# Convert the timestamp to Windows 64-bit timestamp format
|
|
trust_timestamp = long(
|
|
time.mktime(
|
|
entry.single_value.get('modifytimestamp').timetuple()
|
|
)*1e7+116444736000000000)
|
|
|
|
forest = DNSName(self.local_domain.info['dns_forest'])
|
|
# tforest is IPA forest. keep the line below for future checks
|
|
# tforest = DNSName(self.remote_domain.info['dns_forest'])
|
|
for dom in realm_domains['associateddomain']:
|
|
d = DNSName(dom)
|
|
|
|
# We should skip all DNS subdomains of our forest
|
|
# because we are going to add *.<forest> TLN anyway
|
|
if forest.is_superdomain(d) and forest != d:
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
# We also should skip single label TLDs as they
|
|
# cannot be added as TLNs
|
|
if len(d.labels) == 1:
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
ftinfo = dict()
|
|
ftinfo['rec_name'] = dom
|
|
ftinfo['rec_time'] = trust_timestamp
|
|
ftinfo['rec_type'] = lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_TOP_LEVEL_NAME
|
|
self.local_domain.ftinfo_records.append(ftinfo)
|
|
|
|
def join_ad_full_credentials(self, realm, realm_server, realm_admin,
|
|
realm_passwd, trust_type):
|
|
if not self.configured:
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
if not(isinstance(self.remote_domain, TrustDomainInstance)):
|
|
self.populate_remote_domain(
|
|
realm,
|
|
realm_server,
|
|
realm_admin,
|
|
realm_passwd
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
trust_external = bool(self.__allow_behavior & TRUST_JOIN_EXTERNAL)
|
|
if self.remote_domain.info['dns_domain'] != \
|
|
self.remote_domain.info['dns_forest']:
|
|
if not trust_external:
|
|
raise errors.NotAForestRootError(
|
|
forest=self.remote_domain.info['dns_forest'],
|
|
domain=self.remote_domain.info['dns_domain'])
|
|
|
|
if not self.remote_domain.read_only:
|
|
trustdom_pass = samba.generate_random_password(128, 128)
|
|
self.get_realmdomains()
|
|
|
|
# Establishing trust may throw an exception for topology
|
|
# conflict. If it was solved, re-establish the trust again
|
|
# Otherwise let the CLI to display a message about the conflict
|
|
with ipautil.private_krb5_config(realm, realm_server, dir='/tmp'):
|
|
try:
|
|
self.remote_domain.establish_trust(self.local_domain,
|
|
trustdom_pass,
|
|
trust_type,
|
|
trust_external)
|
|
except TrustTopologyConflictSolved:
|
|
# we solved topology conflict, retry again
|
|
self.remote_domain.establish_trust(self.local_domain,
|
|
trustdom_pass,
|
|
trust_type,
|
|
trust_external)
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
self.local_domain.establish_trust(self.remote_domain,
|
|
trustdom_pass,
|
|
trust_type, trust_external)
|
|
except TrustTopologyConflictSolved:
|
|
self.local_domain.establish_trust(self.remote_domain,
|
|
trustdom_pass,
|
|
trust_type, trust_external)
|
|
|
|
# if trust is inbound, we don't need to verify it because
|
|
# AD DC will respond with WERR_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN --
|
|
# it only does verification for outbound trusts.
|
|
result = True
|
|
if trust_type == TRUST_BIDIRECTIONAL:
|
|
with ipautil.private_krb5_config(realm,
|
|
realm_server, dir='/tmp'):
|
|
result = self.remote_domain.verify_trust(self.local_domain)
|
|
return dict(
|
|
local=self.local_domain,
|
|
remote=self.remote_domain,
|
|
verified=result
|
|
)
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
def join_ad_ipa_half(self, realm, realm_server, trustdom_passwd, trust_type):
|
|
if not self.configured:
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
if not(isinstance(self.remote_domain, TrustDomainInstance)):
|
|
self.populate_remote_domain(realm, realm_server, realm_passwd=None)
|
|
|
|
trust_external = bool(self.__allow_behavior & TRUST_JOIN_EXTERNAL)
|
|
if self.remote_domain.info['dns_domain'] != \
|
|
self.remote_domain.info['dns_forest']:
|
|
if not trust_external:
|
|
raise errors.NotAForestRootError(
|
|
forest=self.remote_domain.info['dns_forest'],
|
|
domain=self.remote_domain.info['dns_domain'])
|
|
|
|
self.local_domain.establish_trust(self.remote_domain,
|
|
trustdom_passwd,
|
|
trust_type, trust_external)
|
|
return {
|
|
'local': self.local_domain,
|
|
'remote': self.remote_domain,
|
|
'verified': False,
|
|
}
|