From 3ac176fb86b49a436917d9a9874f0f98731a35f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maxim Dounin Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 01:10:25 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] OCSP stapling: fixed segfault without nextUpdate. OCSP responses may contain no nextUpdate. As per RFC 6960, this means that nextUpdate checks should be bypassed. Handle this gracefully by using NGX_MAX_TIME_T_VALUE as "valid" in such a case. The problem was introduced by 6893a1007a7c (1.9.2). Reported by Matthew Baldwin. --- src/event/ngx_event_openssl_stapling.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/event/ngx_event_openssl_stapling.c b/src/event/ngx_event_openssl_stapling.c index 60051ad47..fa776782c 100644 --- a/src/event/ngx_event_openssl_stapling.c +++ b/src/event/ngx_event_openssl_stapling.c @@ -637,11 +637,16 @@ ngx_ssl_stapling_ocsp_handler(ngx_ssl_ocsp_ctx_t *ctx) goto error; } - valid = ngx_ssl_stapling_time(nextupdate); - if (valid == (time_t) NGX_ERROR) { - ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, ctx->log, 0, - "invalid nextUpdate time in certificate status"); - goto error; + if (nextupdate) { + valid = ngx_ssl_stapling_time(nextupdate); + if (valid == (time_t) NGX_ERROR) { + ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, ctx->log, 0, + "invalid nextUpdate time in certificate status"); + goto error; + } + + } else { + valid = NGX_MAX_TIME_T_VALUE; } OCSP_CERTID_free(id);