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SNI: added restriction for TLSv1.3 cross-SNI session resumption.

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In OpenSSL, session resumption always happens in the default SSL context,
prior to invoking the SNI callback.  Further, unlike in TLSv1.2 and older
protocols, SSL_get_servername() returns values received in the resumption
handshake, which may be different from the value in the initial handshake.
Notably, this makes the restriction added in b720f650b insufficient for
sessions resumed with different SNI server name.

Considering the example from b720f650b, previously, a client was able to
request example.org by presenting a certificate for example.org, then to
resume and request example.com.

The fix is to reject handshakes resumed with a different server name, if
verification of client certificates is enabled in a corresponding server
configuration.
This commit is contained in:
Sergey Kandaurov 2025-01-22 18:55:44 +04:00 committed by pluknet
parent 22a2a225ba
commit 46b9f5d389
2 changed files with 50 additions and 4 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

27
src/http/ngx_http_request.c
View File

@ -932,6 +932,31 @@ ngx_http_ssl_servername(ngx_ssl_conn_t *ssl_conn, int *ad, void *arg)
goto done;
}
sscf = ngx_http_get_module_srv_conf(cscf->ctx, ngx_http_ssl_module);
#if (defined TLS1_3_VERSION \
&& !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
/*
* SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname() is only available in OpenSSL 1.1.1+,
* but servername being negotiated in every TLSv1.3 handshake
* is only returned in OpenSSL 1.1.1+ as well
*/
if (sscf->verify) {
const char *hostname;
hostname = SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname(SSL_get0_session(ssl_conn));
if (hostname != NULL && ngx_strcmp(hostname, servername) != 0) {
c->ssl->handshake_rejected = 1;
*ad = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
}
}
#endif
hc->ssl_servername = ngx_palloc(c->pool, sizeof(ngx_str_t));
if (hc->ssl_servername == NULL) {
goto error;
@ -945,8 +970,6 @@ ngx_http_ssl_servername(ngx_ssl_conn_t *ssl_conn, int *ad, void *arg)
ngx_set_connection_log(c, clcf->error_log);
sscf = ngx_http_get_module_srv_conf(hc->conf_ctx, ngx_http_ssl_module);
c->ssl->buffer_size = sscf->buffer_size;
if (sscf->ssl.ctx) {

27
src/stream/ngx_stream_ssl_module.c
View File

@ -589,12 +589,35 @@ ngx_stream_ssl_servername(ngx_ssl_conn_t *ssl_conn, int *ad, void *arg)
goto done;
}
sscf = ngx_stream_get_module_srv_conf(cscf->ctx, ngx_stream_ssl_module);
#if (defined TLS1_3_VERSION \
&& !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
/*
* SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname() is only available in OpenSSL 1.1.1+,
* but servername being negotiated in every TLSv1.3 handshake
* is only returned in OpenSSL 1.1.1+ as well
*/
if (sscf->verify) {
const char *hostname;
hostname = SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname(SSL_get0_session(ssl_conn));
if (hostname != NULL && ngx_strcmp(hostname, servername) != 0) {
c->ssl->handshake_rejected = 1;
*ad = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
}
}
#endif
s->srv_conf = cscf->ctx->srv_conf;
ngx_set_connection_log(c, cscf->error_log);
sscf = ngx_stream_get_module_srv_conf(s, ngx_stream_ssl_module);
if (sscf->ssl.ctx) {
if (SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl_conn, sscf->ssl.ctx) == NULL) {
goto error;