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Ensure that argc/argv are set for the runtime interpretor, and that

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PYTHONHOME is properly configured.
This commit is contained in:
Neel Patel 2016-08-16 11:29:42 +01:00 committed by Dave Page
parent 035066bd41
commit a3e8ba93ae
1 changed files with 47 additions and 6 deletions
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53
runtime/Server.cpp
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@ -69,8 +69,9 @@ Server::Server(quint16 port)
QString python_path = settings.value("PythonPath").toString();
// Get the application directory
QString app_dir = qApp->applicationDirPath();
QString path_env = qgetenv("PATH");
QString app_dir = qApp->applicationDirPath(),
path_env = qgetenv("PATH"),
pythonHome;
QStringList path_list;
int i;
@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ Server::Server(quint16 port)
QFileInfo venvLibPath(app_dir + "/../Resources/venv/lib/python");
QFileInfo venvDynLibPath(app_dir + "/../Resources/venv/lib/python/lib-dynload");
QFileInfo venvSitePackagesPath(app_dir + "/../Resources/venv/lib/python/site-packages");
QFileInfo venvPath(app_dir + "/../Resources/venv");
// Prepend the bin directory to the path
add_to_path(path_env, venvBinPath.canonicalFilePath(), true);
@ -92,6 +94,7 @@ Server::Server(quint16 port)
add_to_path(python_path, venvLibPath.canonicalFilePath());
add_to_path(python_path, venvDynLibPath.canonicalFilePath());
add_to_path(python_path, venvSitePackagesPath.canonicalFilePath());
add_to_path(pythonHome, venvPath.canonicalFilePath());
#elif defined(Q_OS_WIN)
// In the case we're running in a release application, we need to ensure the
@ -103,6 +106,7 @@ Server::Server(quint16 port)
QFileInfo venvLibPath(app_dir + "/../venv/Lib");
QFileInfo venvDLLsPath(app_dir + "/../venv/DLLs");
QFileInfo venvSitePackagesPath(app_dir + "/../venv/Lib/site-packages");
QFileInfo venvPath(app_dir + "/../venv");
// Prepend the bin directory to the path
add_to_path(path_env, venvBinPath.canonicalFilePath(), true);
@ -110,12 +114,14 @@ Server::Server(quint16 port)
add_to_path(python_path, venvLibPath.canonicalFilePath());
add_to_path(python_path, venvDLLsPath.canonicalFilePath());
add_to_path(python_path, venvSitePackagesPath.canonicalFilePath());
add_to_path(pythonHome, venvPath.canonicalFilePath());
#else
// Build (and canonicalise) the virtual environment path
QFileInfo venvBinPath(app_dir + "/../venv/bin");
QFileInfo venvLibPath(app_dir + "/../venv/lib/python");
QFileInfo venvDynLibPath(app_dir + "/../venv/lib/python/lib-dynload");
QFileInfo venvSitePackagesPath(app_dir + "/../venv/lib/python/site-packages");
QFileInfo venvPath(app_dir + "/../venv");
// Prepend the bin directory to the path
add_to_path(path_env, venvBinPath.canonicalFilePath(), true);
@ -123,6 +129,7 @@ Server::Server(quint16 port)
add_to_path(python_path, venvLibPath.canonicalFilePath());
add_to_path(python_path, venvDynLibPath.canonicalFilePath());
add_to_path(python_path, venvSitePackagesPath.canonicalFilePath());
add_to_path(pythonHome, venvPath.canonicalFilePath());
#endif
qputenv("PATH", path_env.toUtf8().data());
@ -149,10 +156,21 @@ Server::Server(quint16 port)
qputenv("PYTHONPATH", python_path.toUtf8().data());
}
qDebug() << "Full Python path: " << python_path;
qDebug() << "Python path: " << python_path
<< "\nPython Home: " << pythonHome;
if (!pythonHome.isEmpty())
{
#ifdef PYTHON2
Py_SetPythonHome(pythonHome.toUtf8().data());
#else
char *python_home = pythonHome.toUtf8().data();
const size_t cSize = strlen(python_home) + 1;
wchar_t* wcPythonHome = new wchar_t[cSize];
mbstowcs (wcPythonHome, python_home, cSize);
python_path = settings.value("PythonPath").toString();
qDebug() << "User Python path: " << python_path;
Py_SetPythonHome(wcPythonHome);
#endif
}
Py_Initialize();
@ -234,10 +252,33 @@ void Server::run()
// Run the app!
#ifdef PYTHON2
/*
* Untrusted search path vulnerability in the PySys_SetArgv API function in Python 2.6 and earlier, and possibly later
* versions, prepends an empty string to sys.path when the argv[0] argument does not contain a path separator,
* which might allow local users to execute arbitrary code via a Trojan horse Python file in the current working directory.
* Here we have to set arguments explicitly to python interpreter. Check more details in 'PySys_SetArgv' documentation.
*/
char* n_argv[] = { m_appfile.toUtf8().data() };
PySys_SetArgv(1, n_argv);
PyObject* PyFileObject = PyFile_FromString(m_appfile.toUtf8().data(), (char *)"r");
if (PyRun_SimpleFile(PyFile_AsFile(PyFileObject), m_appfile.toUtf8().data()) != 0)
int ret = PyRun_SimpleFile(PyFile_AsFile(PyFileObject), m_appfile.toUtf8().data());
if (ret != 0)
setError(tr("Failed to launch the application server, server thread exiting."));
#else
/*
* Untrusted search path vulnerability in the PySys_SetArgv API function in Python 2.6 and earlier, and possibly later
* versions, prepends an empty string to sys.path when the argv[0] argument does not contain a path separator,
* which might allow local users to execute arbitrary code via a Trojan horse Python file in the current working directory.
* Here we have to set arguments explicitly to python interpreter. Check more details in 'PySys_SetArgv' documentation.
*/
char *appName = m_appfile.toUtf8().data();
const size_t cSize = strlen(appName)+1;
wchar_t* wcAppName = new wchar_t[cSize];
mbstowcs (wcAppName, appName, cSize);
wchar_t* n_argv[] = { wcAppName };
PySys_SetArgv(1, n_argv);
int fd = fileno(cp);
PyObject* PyFileObject = PyFile_FromFd(fd, m_appfile.toUtf8().data(), (char *)"r", -1, NULL, NULL,NULL,1);
if (PyRun_SimpleFile(fdopen(PyObject_AsFileDescriptor(PyFileObject),"r"), m_appfile.toUtf8().data()) != 0)