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unify routing domain handling code, fix edge case generating sender peer info

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This commit is contained in:
John Smith 2024-05-18 18:27:05 -04:00 committed by Christien Rioux
parent 25d804f11a
commit 6a57ee50dc
6 changed files with 145 additions and 105 deletions
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5
veilid-core/src/network_manager/mod.rs
View File

@ -1090,7 +1090,7 @@ impl NetworkManager {
};
// Cache the envelope information in the routing table
let source_noderef = match routing_table.register_node_with_existing_connection(
let mut source_noderef = match routing_table.register_node_with_existing_connection(
envelope.get_sender_typed_id(),
flow,
ts,
@ -1104,6 +1104,9 @@ impl NetworkManager {
};
source_noderef.add_envelope_version(envelope.get_version());
// Enforce routing domain
source_noderef.merge_filter(NodeRefFilter::new().with_routing_domain(routing_domain));
// Pass message to RPC system
rpc.enqueue_direct_message(envelope, source_noderef, flow, routing_domain, body)?;

9
veilid-core/src/routing_table/route_spec_store/mod.rs
View File

@ -1056,6 +1056,11 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
// Set sequencing requirement
first_hop.set_sequencing(sequencing);
// Enforce the routing domain
first_hop.merge_filter(
NodeRefFilter::new().with_routing_domain(RoutingDomain::PublicInternet),
);
// Return the compiled safety route
//info!("compile_safety_route profile (stub): {} us", (get_timestamp() - profile_start_ts));
return Ok(CompiledRoute {
@ -1113,6 +1118,10 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
// Ensure sequencing requirement is set on first hop
first_hop.set_sequencing(safety_spec.sequencing);
// Enforce the routing domain
first_hop
.merge_filter(NodeRefFilter::new().with_routing_domain(RoutingDomain::PublicInternet));
// Get the safety route secret key
let secret = safety_rsd.secret_key;

83
veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/destination.rs
View File

@ -28,6 +28,14 @@ pub(crate) enum Destination {
},
}
/// Routing configuration for destination
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct UnsafeRoutingInfo {
pub opt_node: Option<NodeRef>,
pub opt_relay: Option<NodeRef>,
pub opt_routing_domain: Option<RoutingDomain>,
}
impl Destination {
pub fn node(&self) -> Option<NodeRef> {
match self {
@ -138,6 +146,81 @@ impl Destination {
}
}
}
pub fn get_unsafe_routing_info(
&self,
routing_table: RoutingTable,
) -> Option<UnsafeRoutingInfo> {
// If there's a safety route in use, the safety route will be responsible for the routing
match self.get_safety_selection() {
SafetySelection::Unsafe(_) => {}
SafetySelection::Safe(_) => {
return None;
}
}
// Get:
// * The target node (possibly relayed)
// * The routing domain we are sending to if we can determine it
let (opt_node, opt_relay, opt_routing_domain) = match self {
Destination::Direct {
node,
safety_selection: _,
} => {
let opt_routing_domain = node.best_routing_domain();
if opt_routing_domain.is_none() {
// No routing domain for target, no node info
// Only a stale connection or no connection exists
log_rpc!(debug "No routing domain for node: node={}", node);
};
(Some(node.clone()), None, opt_routing_domain)
}
Destination::Relay {
relay,
node,
safety_selection: _,
} => {
// Outbound relays are defined as routing to and from PublicInternet only right now
// Resolve the relay for this target's routing domain and see if it matches this relay
let mut opt_routing_domain = None;
for target_rd in node.routing_domain_set() {
// Check out inbound/outbound relay to match routing domain
if let Some(relay_node) = routing_table.relay_node(target_rd) {
if relay.same_entry(&relay_node) {
// Relay for this destination is one of our routing domain relays (our inbound or outbound)
opt_routing_domain = Some(target_rd);
break;
}
}
// Check remote node's published relay to see if that who is relaying
if let Some(target_relay) = node.relay(target_rd).ok().flatten() {
if relay.same_entry(&target_relay) {
// Relay for this destination is one of its published relays
opt_routing_domain = Some(target_rd);
break;
}
}
}
if opt_routing_domain.is_none() {
// In the case of an unexpected relay, log it and don't pass any sender peer info into an unexpected relay
log_rpc!(debug "Unexpected relay used for node: relay={}, node={}", relay, node);
};
(Some(node.clone()), Some(relay.clone()), opt_routing_domain)
}
Destination::PrivateRoute {
private_route: _,
safety_selection: _,
} => (None, None, Some(RoutingDomain::PublicInternet)),
};
Some(UnsafeRoutingInfo {
opt_node,
opt_relay,
opt_routing_domain,
})
}
}
impl fmt::Display for Destination {

50
veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/mod.rs
View File

@ -53,11 +53,13 @@ use storage_manager::*;
struct RPCMessageHeaderDetailDirect {
/// The decoded header of the envelope
envelope: Envelope,
/// The noderef of the peer that sent the message (not the original sender). Ensures node doesn't get evicted from routing table until we're done with it
/// The noderef of the peer that sent the message (not the original sender).
/// Ensures node doesn't get evicted from routing table until we're done with it
/// Should be filted to the routing domain of the peer that we received from
peer_noderef: NodeRef,
/// The flow from the peer sent the message (not the original sender)
flow: Flow,
/// The routing domain the message was sent through
/// The routing domain of the peer that we received from
routing_domain: RoutingDomain,
}
@ -869,51 +871,36 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
// Don't do this if the sender is to remain private
// Otherwise we would be attaching the original sender's identity to the final destination,
// thus defeating the purpose of the safety route entirely :P
match dest.get_safety_selection() {
SafetySelection::Unsafe(_) => {}
SafetySelection::Safe(_) => {
return SenderPeerInfo::default();
}
}
// Get the target we're sending to
let routing_table = self.routing_table();
let target = match dest {
Destination::Direct {
node: target,
safety_selection: _,
} => target.clone(),
Destination::Relay {
relay: _,
node: target,
safety_selection: _,
} => target.clone(),
Destination::PrivateRoute {
private_route: _,
safety_selection: _,
} => {
return SenderPeerInfo::default();
}
let Some(UnsafeRoutingInfo {
opt_node, opt_relay: _, opt_routing_domain
}) = dest.get_unsafe_routing_info(self.routing_table.clone()) else {
return SenderPeerInfo::default();
};
let Some(routing_domain) = target.best_routing_domain() else {
let Some(node) = opt_node else {
// If this is going over a private route, don't bother sending any sender peer info
// The other side won't accept it because peer info sent over a private route
// could be used to deanonymize the private route's endpoint
return SenderPeerInfo::default();
};
let Some(routing_domain) = opt_routing_domain else {
// No routing domain for target, no node info
// Only a stale connection or no connection exists
return SenderPeerInfo::default();
};
// Get the target's node info timestamp
let target_node_info_ts = target.node_info_ts(routing_domain);
let target_node_info_ts = node.node_info_ts(routing_domain);
// Return whatever peer info we have even if the network class is not yet valid
// That away we overwrite any prior existing valid-network-class nodeinfo in the remote routing table
let routing_table = self.routing_table();
let own_peer_info = routing_table.get_own_peer_info(routing_domain);
// Get our node info timestamp
let our_node_info_ts = own_peer_info.signed_node_info().timestamp();
// If the target has seen our node info already don't send it again
if target.has_seen_our_node_info_ts(routing_domain, our_node_info_ts) {
if node.has_seen_our_node_info_ts(routing_domain, our_node_info_ts) {
return SenderPeerInfo::new_no_peer_info(target_node_info_ts);
}
@ -1358,6 +1345,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
request: RPCMessage,
answer: RPCAnswer,
) ->RPCNetworkResult<()> {
// Extract destination from respond_to
let dest = network_result_try!(self.get_respond_to_destination(&request));

101
veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/rpc_status.rs
View File

@ -23,81 +23,38 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
self,
dest: Destination,
) -> RPCNetworkResult<Answer<Option<SenderInfo>>> {
let (opt_target_nr, routing_domain, node_status) = match dest.get_safety_selection() {
SafetySelection::Unsafe(_) => {
let (opt_target_nr, routing_domain) = match &dest {
Destination::Direct {
node: target,
safety_selection: _,
} => {
let routing_domain = match target.best_routing_domain() {
Some(rd) => rd,
None => {
// Because this exits before calling 'question()',
// a failure to find a routing domain constitutes a send failure
let send_ts = get_aligned_timestamp();
self.record_send_failure(
RPCKind::Question,
send_ts,
target.clone(),
None,
None,
);
return Ok(NetworkResult::no_connection_other(
"no routing domain for target",
));
}
};
(Some(target.clone()), routing_domain)
}
Destination::Relay {
relay,
node: target,
safety_selection: _,
} => {
let routing_domain = match relay.best_routing_domain() {
Some(rd) => rd,
None => {
// Because this exits before calling 'question()',
// a failure to find a routing domain constitutes a send failure for both the target and its relay
let send_ts = get_aligned_timestamp();
self.record_send_failure(
RPCKind::Question,
send_ts,
relay.clone(),
None,
None,
);
self.record_send_failure(
RPCKind::Question,
send_ts,
target.clone(),
None,
None,
);
return Ok(NetworkResult::no_connection_other(
"no routing domain for peer",
));
}
};
(Some(target.clone()), routing_domain)
}
Destination::PrivateRoute {
private_route: _,
safety_selection: _,
} => (None, RoutingDomain::PublicInternet),
};
// Determine routing domain and node status to send
let (opt_target_nr, routing_domain, node_status) = if let Some(UnsafeRoutingInfo {
opt_node,
opt_relay,
opt_routing_domain,
}) =
dest.get_unsafe_routing_info(self.routing_table.clone())
{
let Some(routing_domain) = opt_routing_domain else {
// Because this exits before calling 'question()',
// a failure to find a routing domain constitutes a send failure
// Record the send failure on both the node and its relay
let send_ts = get_aligned_timestamp();
if let Some(node) = &opt_node {
self.record_send_failure(RPCKind::Question, send_ts, node.clone(), None, None);
}
if let Some(relay) = &opt_relay {
self.record_send_failure(RPCKind::Question, send_ts, relay.clone(), None, None);
}
return Ok(NetworkResult::no_connection_other(
"no routing domain for target",
));
};
let node_status = Some(self.network_manager().generate_node_status(routing_domain));
(opt_target_nr, routing_domain, node_status)
}
SafetySelection::Safe(_) => {
let routing_domain = RoutingDomain::PublicInternet;
let node_status = None;
(None, routing_domain, node_status)
}
let node_status = Some(self.network_manager().generate_node_status(routing_domain));
(opt_node, routing_domain, node_status)
} else {
// Safety route means we don't exchange node status and things are all PublicInternet RoutingDomain
(None, RoutingDomain::PublicInternet, None)
};
// Create status rpc question
let status_q = RPCOperationStatusQ::new(node_status);
let question = RPCQuestion::new(
network_result_try!(self.get_destination_respond_to(&dest)?),

2
veilid-core/src/veilid_api/routing_context.rs
View File

@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ impl RoutingContext {
/// This is useful for checking if you should push new subkeys to the network, or retrieve the current state of a record from the network
/// to see what needs updating locally.
///
/// * `key` is the record key to watch. it must first be opened for reading or writing.
/// * `key` is the record key to inspect. it must first be opened for reading or writing.
/// * `subkeys` is the the range of subkeys to inspect. The range must not exceed 512 discrete non-overlapping or adjacent subranges.
/// If no range is specified, this is equivalent to inspecting the entire range of subkeys. In total, the list of subkeys returned will be truncated at 512 elements.
/// * `scope` is what kind of range the inspection has: