There is a non-zero chance that the Kerberos configuration can't
be retrieved. If this fails it should report an error which will
likely fail the operation but otherwise allow the server to
remain running.
A flag was added to not allow the Master key to be returned
but since this manipulates *config and that is NULL...SEGV.
Add a goto to skip that block in the case of failure.
Credit to Viktor Ashirov for identifying the fix. All I did
was write up the patch.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9914
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
In `ipapwd_get_cur_kvno()`, the `Slapi_ValueSet` obtained via
`slapi_attr_get_valueset()` was never freed. This function returns a
copy of the valueset that must be freed by the caller using
`slapi_valueset_free()`.
Add `slapi_valueset_free(svs)` before returning from the function.
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9895
Signed-off-by: Viktor Ashirov <vashirov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abbra@users.noreply.github.com>
In `ipapwd_gen_hashes()`, when an error occurred after allocating output
parameters, `*ntvals` was freed but `*nthash` was not.
Add `slapi_ch_free_string(nthash)` to the error cleanup section.
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9895
Signed-off-by: Viktor Ashirov <vashirov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abbra@users.noreply.github.com>
In `ipapwd_post_modadd()`, the `pwvals` array returned by
`ipapwd_setPasswordHistory()` was passed to `slapi_mods_add_mod_values()`
but never freed. The `slapi_mods_add_mod_values()` function makes a copy
of the values, so the original array still needs to be freed.
Add `ipapwd_free_slapi_value_array()` call in the cleanup section to
free the array.
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9895
Signed-off-by: Viktor Ashirov <vashirov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abbra@users.noreply.github.com>
In `ipapwd_pre_add()` and `ipapwd_pre_mod()`, the `nt` string returned
by `ipapwd_gen_hashes()` was only freed when `is_smb` was true. When NT
hashes are generated for `is_ipant` entries but `is_smb` is false, the
`nt` string was leaked.
Free `nt`, `ntvals` and `svals` unconditionally.
Fix the error path in `ipapwd_pre_add()` where `nt` and `ntvals` were
leaked when `slapi_entry_attr_replace_sv()` failed for `svals`.
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9895
Signed-off-by: Viktor Ashirov <vashirov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abbra@users.noreply.github.com>
In `ipapwd_pre_add()` and `ipapwd_pre_mod()`, `binddn` is obtained via
`slapi_pblock_get()` with SLAPI_CONN_DN which returns an allocated
string. This string was never freed after use.
Add `slapi_ch_free_string(&binddn)` calls after the bind DN is no longer
needed in both functions.
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9895
Signed-off-by: Viktor Ashirov <vashirov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abbra@users.noreply.github.com>
In `ipapwd_pre_add()`, when processing password from entry extension,
`userpw` was reassigned without freeing the previous value.
Additionally, `enabled` obtained from `ipapwd_getIpaConfigAttr()` was
never freed, and early returns bypassed the cleanup section causing
memory leaks.
Free `userpw` before reassigning it.
Free `enabled` after use.
Replace early `return 0` statements with `goto done` to ensure proper
cleanup of all allocated resources.
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9895
Signed-off-by: Viktor Ashirov <vashirov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abbra@users.noreply.github.com>
In `ipapwd_chpwop()`, `ipapwd_setkeytab()`, and `ipapwd_getkeytab()`
functions, `bindDN`/`bind_dn` is obtained via `slapi_pblock_get()` with
SLAPI_CONN_DN which returns an allocated string. This string was never
freed in the cleanup sections of these functions.
Add `slapi_ch_free_string()` calls for the bind DN variables in the
`free_and_return` sections of all three functions.
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9895
Signed-off-by: Viktor Ashirov <vashirov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abbra@users.noreply.github.com>
In `ipapwd_set_extradata` free `xdata` after it's not longer needed. It
was leaked because `slapi_value_new_berval()` makes a copy of the data.
In `ipapwd_free_slapi_value_array` free `svals` (caller's pointer)
instead of `sv` (local pointer).
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9895
Signed-off-by: Viktor Ashirov <vashirov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abbra@users.noreply.github.com>
In various code paths the `ctx` structure was freed, but not `ctx`
resources (`base_dn`, `nss_ctx`, `extdom_instance_counter`) which may
have been allocated.
Plugin didn't have SLAPI_PLUGIN_CLOSE_FN registered, so context was
never freed on server shutdown.
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9895
Signed-off-by: Viktor Ashirov <vashirov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abbra@users.noreply.github.com>
When a trust was established pre samba 4.23, the trust domain object
could contain ipanttrustattributes: 8 (LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST)
This value prevents winbind restart.
The current code replaces 0 with LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE
but should also handle the case for LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST.
In this case we should drop the bit and replace it by FOREST_TRANSITIVE
one because otherwise Samba will skip the domain. Do not change the LDAP
representation to allow older replicas to continue operations.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9892
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abbra@users.noreply.github.com>
Add new attribute, SysAcctManagersDNs, to store list of DNs allowed to
reset user passwords without forcing the users to change them
afterwards.
This list will differ from the use of PassSyncManagersDNs by the fact
that password policy checks will still apply to those password changes.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9842
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rafael Guterres Jeffman <rjeffman@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Thomas Woerner <twoerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <frenaud@redhat.com>
The Modrdn plugin doesn't check whether the operation it processes is replicated.
This results in duplicate operations on each replica, for example, when deleting a saved user.
To fix this behavior, a check was added to the Modrdn plugin that the operation is not replicated.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9867
Signed-off-by: vectinx <vectinx@yandex.ru>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
We already have libpwquality plumbed in. The ask here was
to support the quality credits as well.
There are four credits: digits, uppers, lowers and others
These either count complexity towards satisfying the minimum
length or set the minimum number of a type allowed.
If any of the four credits is configured then it will cause
the password policy plugin to go through the libpwquality.
Reminder that libpwquality sets its own min password length
floor that should be overridden already.
If min_classes is set as well then that is still enforced.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9835
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: David Hanina <dhanina@redhat.com>
MS-KILE's PA-PAC-REQUEST sequence allows the Kerberos client to request
a TGT without a PAC. At the moment, there is no way to configure the MIT
KDC to reject such request.
This commit enforces the presence of the PAC when processing TGTs
provided by TGS-REQ. It ensures the server principal of the TGT is the
same as the one in PAC_CLIENT_INFO (i.e. enforces client principal
canonicalization) with integrity check.
Only one exception is applied: this check is skipped for local TGTs on
domain where the MS-PAC generator is not initialized (i.e. domains where
SID generation was not executed yet).
Signed-off-by: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Do not need to have duplicates as we include them. They used to be not
exported by Samba but not anymore.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
Samba 4.23 ignores trust to PIM and 'within the forest' domains. It
didn't know what to do with them in past as well but starting with 4.23
the domain trust entries which have trust attributes with
LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_PIM_TRUST and LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST bits
set will be ignored.
FreeIPA did default to LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST for domains
stored with trusted attributes set to 0 or missing. This was behavior in
past for Samba as well. Since FreeIPA only supports forest trust and an
external trust, in both cases we should set explicit LSA trust attribute
bits:
- LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE for the forest trust
- LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_NON_TRANSITIVE for the external trust
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9852
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
[MS-DRSR] 5.64 FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION defines version of the
ForestTrustInfo structure as 1. We didn't set it so it was defaulting to
zero. Samba validates the version number and rejects ForestTrustInfo
structures from FreeIPA.
Make sure new structures are always set to version 1 and old strutures
fixed up to have version 1.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9852
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
acl_list was set to prev->tl_data_contents and its value is freed but
then is is freed again outside of the if(). Just reset acl_list pointer
as prev->tl_data_contents is removed unconditionally outside of the RBCD
ACL removal.
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9367
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
All MIT krb5 keys are encoded with an encryption type identifier and a
KVNO (key version number). The KVNO is referring to the original
credentials string (and its associated salt) which was used to generate
the key using the derivation function of the associated encryption type.
So far, when a set of Kerberos keys was provided to ipa-kdb, only the
newest KVNO ones were saved in a single "krbPrincipalKey" LDAP
attribute. All the older ones were deleted in the process.
This commit allows to keep older keys by splitting them in multiple
"krbPrincipalKey" attribute based on their KVNO.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9370
Signed-off-by: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
The final call to ipadb_reinit_mspac() in ipadb_get_connection() is not
considered essential for the function to succeed, as there might be
cases where the required pieces of information to generate PACs are not
yet configured in the database. However, in environments where 389ds is
overwhelmed, the LDAP connection established at the beginning of
ipadb_get_connection() might already be lost while executing
ipadb_reinit_mspac().
Connection errors were not distinguished from configuration errors,
which could result in ipadb_get_connection() succeeding while the LDAP
context is set to null, leading to a KDC crash on the next LDAP request.
ipadb_get_connection() now explicitly checks the value of the LDAP
context before returning.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9777
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
ipa-dnskeysyncd daemon relies on both OpenDNSSEC and BIND accessing the
same cryptographic token. We use SoftHSMv2 here and store token in
DNSSEC_TOKENS_DIR, defined by the IPA platform.
Configure ipa-dnskeysyncd service to update permissions of the token
files using custom systemd-tmpfiles configuration.
Extend SELinux policy to handle access to the token under a separate
file context. Both token and its pin file need to be accessed by the BIND
rndc tool.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9696
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
The KDC logs when a user who is locked out with
Client's credentials have been revoked
The LDAP server did not. This adds a message so administrators
can tell when a user is locked out.
ALERT - ipalockout_postop - User uid=tuser,cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=example,dc=test is locked out. Too many failed authentication attempts.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9742
Signed-off-by: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
If there is no client secret specified for the OIDC client, don't push
it to oidc_child via stdin. oidc_child does only expect client secret if
--client-secret-stdin option was specified and we already specify it
only if client secret is not empty.
In addition, if client secret is empty (it is a public OIDC client),
then strlen(NULL) would crash in glibc internals. Avoid that!
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9734
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
To remove the client secret from the command line where it would be
visible e.g. when calling ps it is now passed via stdin to oidc_child.
Fixes: CVE-2024-11029
Signed-off-by: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
OTP use during LDAP bind can be enforced either explicitly via client
specifying a control with OID 2.16.840.1.113730.3.8.10.7 and no payload
or implicitly through the global IPA configuration with EnforceLDAPOTP.
OTP token enforcement overrides IPA user authentication types
requirements:
If OTP enforcement is required:
- if user authentication types still allow password authentication,
authentication with just a password is denied, regardless whether OTP
tokens are associated with the user or not.
If OTP enforcement is not required:
- if user has no OTP tokens but user authentication types require OTP
use, authentication with just a password is allowed until a token is
added.
- if user has OTP tokens and user authentication types require OTP use
but not password, authentication with just a password is denied.
Additionally, enforcement of OTP only applies to LDAP objects which
don't use 'simpleSecurityObject' objectclass. This allows system service
accounts to continue authenticate with a password regardless of the
OTP enforcement.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9699
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9711
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
If only OTP authentication is allowed, and a user tries to login with an
expired token, do not let them log in with their password. Forcing the
admin to intervene. If the user does not have an OTP token then allow
them to log in with a password until an OTP token is configured
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9387
Signed-off-by: Mark Reynolds <mreynolds@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
For users who has no OTP tokens defined (yet), a missing token should
not be seen as a failure. This is needed to allow a basic password
change.
The logic around enforcement of OTP over LDAP bind is the following:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
- when LDAP OTP control is requested by the LDAP client, OTP is
explicitly required
- when EnforceLDAPOTP is set in the IPA configuration, OTP is implicitly
required, regardless of the state of LDAP client
In either case, only users with 'user-auth-type: otp' are allowed to
authenticate.
If these users have no OTP token associated yet, they will be allowed to
authenticate with their password. This is to allow initial password
change and adding an OTP token.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Implement test that simulates lifecycle for new user who get to change
their password before adding an OTP token.
Related: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/5169
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <frenaud@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rob Crittenden <rcritten@redhat.com>
find_sid_for_ldap_entry could fail in several ways if a Posix ID can not
be converted to an unused SID. This could happen for example for ducplicate
IDs or user/group out of range.
This change enables ipa_sidgen_task to continue in the error case to try
to convert the entries without errors. The error messages have been
extended to additionally show the DN string for the bad entries.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9618
Signed-off-by: Thomas Woerner <twoerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
The initial design for ticket flags was implementing this logic:
* If a ticket policy is defined for the principal entry, use flags from
this policy if they are set. Otherwise, use default ticket flags.
* If no ticket policy is defined for the principal entry, but there is a
global one, use flags from the global ticket policy if they are set.
Otherwise, use default ticket flags.
* If no policy (principal nor global) is defined, use default ticket
flags.
However, this logic was broken by a1165ffb which introduced creation of
a principal-level ticket policy in case the ticket flag set is modified.
This was typically the case for the -allow_tix flag, which was set
virtually by the KDB driver when a user was locked until they initialize
their password on first kinit pre-authentication.
This was causing multiple issues, which are mitigated by the new
approach:
Now flags from each level are combined together. There flags like
+requires_preauth which are set systematically by the KDB diver, as
well as -allow_tix which is set based on the value of "nsAccountLock".
This commit also adds the implicit -allow_svr ticket flag for user
principals to protect users against Kerberoast-type attacks. None of
these flags are stored in the LDAP database, they are hard-coded in the
KDB driver.
In addition to these "virtual" ticket flags, flags from both global and
principal ticket policies are applied (if these policies exist).
Principal ticket policies are not supported for hosts and services, but
this is only an HTTP API limitation. The "krbTicketPolicyAux" object
class is supported for all account types. This is required for ticket
flags like +ok_to_auth_as_delegate. Such flags can be set using "ipa
host-mod" and "ipa serivce-mod", or using kadmin's "modprinc".
It is possible to ignore flags from the global ticket policy or default
flags like -allow_svr for a user principal by setting the
"final_user_tkt_flags" string attribute to "true" in kadmin. In this
case, any ticket flag can be configured in the principal ticket policy,
except requires_preauth and allow_tix.
When in IPA setup mode (using the "ipa-setup-override-restrictions" KDB
argument), all the system described above is disabled and ticket flags
are written in the principal ticket policy as they are provided. This is
required to initialize the Kerberos LDAP container during IPA server
installation.
This fixes CVE-2024-3183
Signed-off-by: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
The initial implementation of MS-SFU by MIT Kerberos was missing a
condition for granting the "forwardable" flag on S4U2Self tickets.
Fixing this mistake required adding special case for the
check_allowed_to_delegate() function: if the target service argument is
NULL, then it means the KDC is probing for general constrained
delegation rules, not actually checking a specific S4U2Proxy request.
In commit e86807b5, the behavior of ipadb_match_acl() was modified to
match the changes from upstream MIT Kerberos a441fbe3. However, a
mistake resulted in this mechanism to apply in cases where target
service argument is set AND unset. This results in S4U2Proxy requests to
be accepted regardless of the fact there is a matching service
delegation rule or not.
This vulnerability does not affect services having RBCD (resource-based
constrained delegation) rules.
This fixes CVE-2024-2698
Signed-off-by: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
The function slapi_pblock_set_flag_operation_notes(); is defined in
ldap/servers/slapd/pblock.c in 389-ds but is only available through
slapi-private.h header, not through slapi-plugin.h public API.
It was introduced in ~1.4.1.7 (~2019) via https://pagure.io/389-ds-base/issue/50349.
Since we only use it with an MFA note, all versions of the 389-ds that
will support MFA note will have this function.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/9554
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
When authentication indicators were introduced in 2016, ipa-pwd-extop
plugin gained ability to reject LDAP BIND when an LDAP client insists
the authentication must use an OTP token. This is used by ipa-otpd to
ensure Kerberos authentication using OTP method is done with at least
two factors (the token and the password).
This enfrocement is only possible when an LDAP client sends the LDAP
control. There are cases when LDAP clients cannot be configured to send
a custom LDAP control during BIND operation. For these clients an LDAP
BIND against an account that only has password and no valid token would
succeed even if admins intend it to fail.
Ability to do LDAP BIND without a token was added to allow users to add
their own OTP tokens securely. If administrators require full
enforcement over LDAP BIND, it is cannot be achieved with LDAP without
sending the LDAP control to do so.
Add IPA configuration string, EnforceLDAPOTP, to allow administrators to
prevent LDAP BIND with a password only if user is required to have OTP
tokens. With this configuration enabled, it will be not possible for
users to add OTP token if one is missing, thus ensuring no user can
authenticate without OTP and admins will have to add initial OTP tokens
to users explicitly.
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/5169
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Florence Blanc-Renaud <flo@redhat.com>
Rob Crittenden
Viktor Ashirov
Florence Blanc-Renaud
Alexander Bokovoy
vectinx
Julien Rische
Sumit Bose
Mark Reynolds
Thomas Woerner