Using the client IP address was a rather poor mechanism for controlling
who could request certificates for whom. Instead the client machine will
bind using the host service principal and request the certificate.
In order to do this:
* the service will need to exist
* the machine needs to be in the certadmin rolegroup
* the host needs to be in the managedBy attribute of the service
It might look something like:
admin
ipa host-add client.example.com --password=secret123
ipa service-add HTTP/client.example.com
ipa service-add-host --hosts=client.example.com HTTP/client.example.com
ipa rolegroup-add-member --hosts=client.example.com certadmin
client
ipa-client-install
ipa-join -w secret123
kinit -kt /etc/krb5.keytab host/client.example.com
ipa -d cert-request file://web.csr --principal=HTTP/client.example.com
There was much back and forth and gnashing of teeth about what the
version should actually be in these pre-releases. We decided it isn't
2.0-ish enough so went with 1.9.0, 1.9.1, etc until we're ready to
declare 2.0.0.
We want to only allow a machine to request a certificate for itself, not for
other machines. I've added a new taksgroup which will allow this.
The requesting IP is resolved and compared to the subject of the CSR to
determine if they are the same host. The same is done with the service
principal. Subject alt names are not queried yet.
This does not yet grant machines actual permission to request certificates
yet, that is still limited to the taskgroup request_certs.
We were seeing a rare deadlock of DS when creating the memberOf task because
one thread was adding memberOf in a postop while another was trying to
create an index and this was causing a PRLock deadlock.
We have to replace 05rfc2247.ldif because it contains some conflicting
attributes with DNS in some older versions of 389-DS/RHDS. This fails on
some newer versions of 389-DS/RHDS so this lets it continue installing
if the new file is not needed.
Use a Class of Service template to do per-group password policy. The
design calls for non-overlapping groups but with cospriority we can
still make sense of things.
The password policy entries stored under the REALM are keyed only on
the group name because the MIT ldap plugin can't handle quotes in the
DN. It also can't handle spaces between elements in the DN.
Password policy entries must be a child of the entry protected by this
ACI.
Also change the format of this because in DS it was stored as:
\n(target)\n so was base64-encoded when it was retrieved.
In order to run the tests you must put your DM password into
~/.ipa/.dmpw
Some tests are expected to generate errors. Don't let any ERROR
messages from the updater fool you, watch the pass/fail of the nosetests.
