In at least one case, when an LDAP socket closes, a read event is fired
rather than an error event. Without this patch, ipa-otpd silently
ignores this event and enters a state where all bind auths fail.
To remedy this problem, we pass error events along the same path as read
events. Should the actual read fail, we exit.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1377858https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/6368
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Using a pragma instead of guards is easier to write, less error prone
and avoids name clashes (a source of very subtle bugs). This pragma
is supported on almost all compilers, including all the compilers we
care about: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragma_once#Portability.
This patch does not change the autogenerated files: asn1/asn1c/*.h.
Reviewed-By: Martin Basti <mbasti@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Christian Heimes <cheimes@redhat.com>
Before this patch, if either password or password+otp were permitted,
only the otp preauth mech would be returned to the client. Now, the
client will receive either enc_ts or enc_chl in addition to otp.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/433
Reviewed-By: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Before this patch, if the user was configured for either OTP or password
it was possible to do a 1FA authentication through ipa-otpd. Because this
correctly respected the configuration, it is not a security error.
However, once we begin to insert authentication indicators into the
Kerberos tickets, we cannot allow 1FA authentications through this
code path. Otherwise the ticket would contain a 2FA indicator when
only 1FA was actually performed.
To solve this problem, we have ipa-otpd send a critical control during
the bind operation which informs the LDAP server that it *MUST* validate
an OTP token for authentication to be successful. Next, we implement
support for this control in the ipa-pwd-extop plugin. The end result is
that the bind operation will always fail if the control is present and
no OTP is validated.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/433
Reviewed-By: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
This gives us a place to handle all OTP related controls. Also,
genericize otpctrl_present() so that the OID can be specified as an
argument to the function call.
These changes are preparatory for the subsequent patches.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/433
Reviewed-By: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
We always have to call find_base() in order to force libldap to open
the socket. However, if no base is actually required then there is
no reason to error out if find_base() fails. This condition can arise
when anonymous binds are disabled.
Reviewed-By: Martin Basti <mbasti@redhat.com>
Temporarily storing the offset time in an unsigned integer causes the
value of the offset to underflow when a (valid) negative offset value
is generated. Using a signed variable avoids this problem.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/5333
Reviewed-By: Tomas Babej <tbabej@redhat.com>
In general, TCP is a better fit for FreeIPA due to large packet sizes.
However, there is also a specific need for TCP when using OTP. If a UDP
packet is delivered to the server and the server takes longer to process
it than the client timeout (likely), the OTP value will be resent.
Unfortunately, this will cause failures or even lockouts. Switching to
TCP avoids this problem altogether.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4725
Reviewed-By: Martin Kosek <mkosek@redhat.com>
This enables plugins to share authentication configuration cache code.
Additionally, update the caching mechanism to be declarative and faster.
Reviewed-By: Thierry Bordaz <tbordaz@redhat.com>
There are no major changes in this commit other than changing filenames
and symbols to have consistent namespaces. This prepares for larger
changes to come in subsequent commits.
Reviewed-By: Thierry Bordaz <tbordaz@redhat.com>
This is possible because python-qrcode's output now fits in a standard
terminal. Also, update ipa-otp-import and otptoken-add-yubikey to
disable QR code output as it doesn't make sense in these contexts.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4703
Reviewed-By: Petr Vobornik <pvoborni@redhat.com>
Before this patch users could log in using only the OTP value. This
arose because ipapwd_authentication() successfully determined that
an empty password was invalid, but 389 itself would see this as an
anonymous bind. An anonymous bind would never even get this far in
this code, so we simply deny requests with empty passwords.
This patch resolves CVE-2014-7828.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4690
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
These defaults are pretty useless and cause more confusion than
they are worth. The serial default never worked anyway. And now
that we are displaying the token type separately, there is no
reason to doubly record these data points.
Reviewed-By: Petr Vobornik <pvoborni@redhat.com>
This prevents the reuse of TOTP tokens by recording the last token
interval that was used. This will be replicated as normal. However,
this patch does not increase the number of writes to the database
in the standard authentication case. This is because it also
eliminates an unnecessary write during authentication. Hence, this
patch should be write-load neutral with the existing code.
Further performance enhancement is desired, but is outside the
scope of this patch.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4410
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Also, make the error messages for this fallback case less scary and
clean up some indentation issues in the nearby code which made this
code difficult to read.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4446
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Previous versions of libkrb5 can't handle expired passwords
inside the FAST tunnel. This breaks the password change UI
in FreeIPA.
Reviewed-By: Martin Kosek <mkosek@redhat.com>
The preexisting code would execute two steps. First, it would perform a kinit.
If the kinit failed, it would attempt to bind using the same credentials to
determine if the password were expired. While this method is fairly ugly, it
mostly worked in the past.
However, with OTP this breaks. This is because the OTP code is consumed by
the kinit step. But because the password is expired, the kinit step fails.
When the bind is executed, the OTP token is already consumed, so bind fails.
This causes all password expirations to be reported as invalid credentials.
After discussion with MIT, the best way to handle this case with the standard
tools is to set LC_ALL=C and check the output from the command. This
eliminates the bind step altogether. The end result is that OTP works and
all password failures are more performant.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4412
Reviewed-By: Petr Vobornik <pvoborni@redhat.com>
This command behaves almost exactly like otptoken-add except:
1. The new token data is written directly to a YubiKey
2. The vendor/model/serial fields are populated from the YubiKey
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
This HTTP call takes the following parameters:
* user
* password
* first_code
* second_code
* token (optional)
Using this information, the server will perform token synchronization.
If the token is not specified, all tokens will be searched for synchronization.
Otherwise, only the token specified will be searched.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4218
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
This change has two motivations:
1. Clients don't have to parse the string.
2. Future token types may have new formats.
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
This patch adds support for importing tokens using RFC 6030 key container
files. This includes decryption support. For sysadmin sanity, any tokens
which fail to add will be written to the output file for examination. The
main use case here is where a small subset of a large set of tokens fails
to validate or add. Using the output file, the sysadmin can attempt to
recover these specific tokens.
This code is implemented as a server-side script. However, it doesn't
actually need to run on the server. This was done because importing is an
odd fit for the IPA command framework:
1. We need to write an output file.
2. The operation may be long-running (thousands of tokens).
3. Only admins need to perform this task and it only happens infrequently.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4261
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Before this patch, ipa-kdb would load global configuration on startup and
never update it. This means that if global configuration is changed, the
KDC never receives the new configuration until it is restarted.
This patch enables caching of the global configuration with a timeout of
60 seconds.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4153
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
This also constitutes a rethinking of the token ACIs after the introduction
of SELFDN support.
Admins, as before, have full access to all token permissions.
Normal users have read/search/compare access to all of the non-secret data
for tokens assigned to them, whether managed by them or not. Users can add
tokens if, and only if, they will also manage this token.
Managers can also read/search/compare tokens they manage. Additionally,
they can write non-secret data to their managed tokens and delete them.
When a normal user self-creates a token (the default behavior), then
managedBy is automatically set. When an admin creates a token for another
user (or no owner is assigned at all), then managed by is not set. In this
second case, the token is effectively read-only for the assigned owner.
This behavior enables two important other behaviors. First, an admin can
create a hardware token and assign it to the user as a read-only token.
Second, when the user is deleted, only his self-managed tokens are deleted.
All other (read-only) tokens are instead orphaned. This permits the same
token object to be reasigned to another user without loss of any counter
data.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4228https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4259
Reviewed-By: Jan Cholasta <jcholast@redhat.com>
Creating tokens for yourself is the most common operation. Making this the
default optimizes for the common case.
Reviewed-By: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Jan Cholasta <jcholast@redhat.com>
Specifying the default in the LDAP Object causes the parameter to be specified
for non-add operations. This is especially problematic when performing the
modify operation as it causes the primary key to change for every
modification.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4227
Reviewed-By: Petr Viktorin <pviktori@redhat.com>
If the KDC doesn't use the FreeIPA password for authentication, then it is
futile to provide this information. Doing so will only confuse the user. It
also causes password change dialogues when the password is irrelevant.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4299
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
RFC 4226 states the following in section 4:
R6 - The algorithm MUST use a strong shared secret. The length of
the shared secret MUST be at least 128 bits. This document
RECOMMENDs a shared secret length of 160 bits.
Reviewed-By: Jan Cholasta <jcholast@redhat.com>
We had originally decided to provide defaults on the server side so that they
could be part of a global config for the admin. However, on further reflection,
only certain defaults really make sense given the limitations of Google
Authenticator. Similarly, other defaults may be token specific.
Attempting to handle defaults on the server side also makes both the UI and
the generated documentation unclear.
Reviewed-By: Jan Cholasta <jcholast@redhat.com>
In the parameters system, we have been checking for a positive list of values
which get converted to None. The problem is that this method can in some
cases throw warnings when type coercion doesn't work (particularly, string
to unicode). Instead, any values that evaluate to False that are neither
numeric nor boolean should be converted to None.
Reviewed-By: Jan Pazdziora <jpazdziora@redhat.com>
Originally we made them all optional as a workaround for the lack of SELFDN
support in 389DS. However, with the advent of SELFDN, this hack is no longer
necessary. This patch updates TOTP to match HOTP in this regard.
Reviewed-By: Jan Cholasta <jcholast@redhat.com>
This plugin prevents the deletion or deactivation of the last
valid token for a user. This prevents the user from migrating
back to single factor authentication once OTP has been enabled.
Thanks to Mark Reynolds for helping me with this patch.
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
C99 is supported on all compilers we target and
provides some useful features, including:
* Standard struct initializers
* Compound literals
* For-loop declarations
* Standard bool type
* Variable arrays (use with caution)
* Too many others to mention...
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
This handles the case where a user is configured for OTP in ipaUserAuthType,
but the user has not yet created any tokens. Until the user creates tokens,
the user should still be able to log in via password. This logic already
exists in LDAP, but ipa-kdb needs to perform the same validation to know
what data to return to the KDC.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4154
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
This daemon listens for RADIUS packets on a well known
UNIX domain socket. When a packet is received, it queries
LDAP to see if the user is configured for RADIUS authentication.
If so, then the packet is forwarded to the 3rd party RADIUS server.
Otherwise, a bind is attempted against the LDAP server.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/3366http://freeipa.org/page/V3/OTP
If OTP is enabled for a user, then:
1. Long-term keys are not provided to KDB
2. The user string 'otp' is defined to KDB
Since it is not secure to send radius configuration information
over krb5 user strings, we simply set the string to a known default
('[]') which enables the default configuration in the KDC.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/3561http://freeipa.org/page/V3/OTP
This schema addition will be useful for future commits. It allows us to
define permitted external authentication methods on both the user and
global config. The implementation is generic, but the immediate usage
is for otp support.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/3365http://freeipa.org/page/V3/OTP
Nathaniel McCallum
Nathaniel McCallum