Allow ADMIN OPTION holders to manage Group Role membership. #9450 (#10315)

Users holding ADMIN OPTION on a role, directly or through an inherited
membership as PostgreSQL itself allows, can now change its members,
whilst all other property changes still require CREATEROLE.

web/pgadmin/browser/server_groups/servers/roles/__init__.py

@@ -567,6 +567,18 @@ rolmembership:{
                     except ValueError:
                         data[k] = v
 
+            if not isinstance(data, dict):
+                return precondition_required(
+                    _("Request data must be a JSON object.")
+                )
+
+            # Capture the client-supplied keys before the validators below
+            # mutate 'data' (e.g. _validate_rolemembers adds derived keys
+            # such as 'rol_members_list'), so callers that need to know what
+            # the client actually sent (e.g. the membership-only update
+            # check) can rely on this instead of the mutated dict.
+            self.request_keys = set(data)
+
             invalid_msg_arr = [
                 self._validate_rolname(kwargs.get('rid', -1), data),
                 self._validate_rolvaliduntil(data),
@@ -619,6 +631,7 @@ rolmembership:{
         return fetch_name, check_permission, forbidden_msg
 
     def _check_permission(self, check_permission, action, kwargs):
+        self.membership_only_update = False
         if check_permission:
             user = self.manager.user_info
 
@@ -627,6 +640,15 @@ rolmembership:{
                 (action != 'update' or 'rid' in kwargs) and \
                 kwargs['rid'] != -1 and \
                     user['id'] != kwargs['rid']:
+                # A role that only has ADMIN OPTION on this specific role
+                # (rather than being a superuser or having CREATEROLE) may
+                # still manage that role's membership, so don't forbid the
+                # request outright; the update handler restricts what such
+                # a request is allowed to change to membership only.
+                if action == 'update' and getattr(
+                        self, 'has_admin_option', False):
+                    self.membership_only_update = True
+                    return False
                 return True
         return False
 
@@ -658,9 +680,25 @@ rolmembership:{
             self.role = row['rolname']
             self.rolCanLogin = row['rolcanlogin']
             self.rolSuper = row['rolsuper']
+            self.has_admin_option = row.get('has_admin_option', False)
 
         return False, ''
 
+    def _has_admin_option(self, rid):
+        """Return True if the connecting user may GRANT/REVOKE membership
+        in the role 'rid', as determined by permission.sql. Any failure to
+        look it up counts as False, so the dialog fails closed."""
+        status, res = self.conn.execute_dict(
+            render_template(
+                self.sql_path + 'permission.sql',
+                rid=rid,
+                conn=self.conn
+            )
+        )
+        if not status or len(res['rows']) == 0:
+            return False
+        return bool(res['rows'][0].get('has_admin_option', False))
+
     def check_precondition(action=None):
         """
         This function will behave as a decorator which will checks the status
@@ -713,16 +751,20 @@ rolmembership:{
                 fetch_name, check_permission, \
                     forbidden_msg = RoleView._check_action(action, kwargs)
 
-                is_permission_error = self._check_permission(check_permission,
-                                                             action, kwargs)
-                if is_permission_error:
-                    return forbidden(forbidden_msg)
-
+                # Fetched first: the permission check needs to know
+                # whether the current user holds ADMIN OPTION on this
+                # role before it can decide whether to forbid the
+                # request.
                 is_error, errmsg = self._check_and_fetch_name(fetch_name,
                                                               kwargs)
                 if is_error:
                     return errmsg
 
+                is_permission_error = self._check_permission(check_permission,
+                                                             action, kwargs)
+                if is_permission_error:
+                    return forbidden(forbidden_msg)
+
                 return f(self, **kwargs)
 
             return wrapped
@@ -895,6 +937,11 @@ rolmembership:{
         res['rows'][0]['is_sys_obj'] = (
             res['rows'][0]['oid'] <= self._DATABASE_LAST_SYSTEM_OID or
             self.datistemplate)
+        # Tell the dialog whether the connecting user may manage this role's
+        # membership (ADMIN OPTION, held directly or through another role).
+        # The same permission.sql drives the update guard, so the UI and the
+        # backend cannot disagree about who qualifies.
+        res['rows'][0]['has_admin_option'] = self._has_admin_option(rid)
         res = {**res['rows'][0], 'variables': variables['rows']}
         return ajax_response(
             response=res,
@@ -1023,6 +1070,19 @@ rolmembership:{
     @check_precondition(action='update')
     @validate_request
     def update(self, gid, sid, rid):
+        # The properties dialog always sends the role's 'oid' alongside the
+        # changed fields, so it is allowed here as well; the role being
+        # updated is identified by 'rid' from the URL, not by that value.
+        # request_keys is set by validate_request; if that has not run the
+        # guard must fail closed rather than let the request through.
+        if getattr(self, 'membership_only_update', False) and \
+                not getattr(self, 'request_keys', set()) <= \
+                {'rolmembers', 'oid'}:
+            return forbidden(
+                _("The current user does not have permission to update "
+                  "the role. Users with ADMIN OPTION on this role may "
+                  "only manage its membership.")
+            )
 
         sql = render_template(
             self.sql_path + self._UPDATE_SQL,

web/pgadmin/browser/server_groups/servers/roles/static/js/role.ui.js

@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ export default class RoleSchema extends BaseUISchema {
 
     this.isReadOnly = null;
     this.nodeInfo = this.fieldOptions.nodeInfo;
-    this.user = this.nodeInfo.server.user;
   }
 
   get idAttribute() {
@@ -55,6 +54,19 @@ export default class RoleSchema extends BaseUISchema {
     return (!(user.is_superuser || user.can_create_role) && user.id != state.oid);
   }
 
+  // A role that isn't a superuser or CREATEROLE holder can still manage
+  // this role's membership if they hold ADMIN OPTION on it, directly or
+  // through another role. The backend works that out (has_admin_option in
+  // the properties response) with the same query that gates the update,
+  // so it is not re-derived from the member list here.
+  isMemberAdmin(state) {
+    return Boolean(state?.has_admin_option);
+  }
+
+  membersReadOnly(state) {
+    return this.readOnly(state) && !this.isMemberAdmin(state);
+  }
+
   memberDataFormatter(rawData) {
     let members = '';
     if(_.isObject(rawData)) {
@@ -194,8 +206,8 @@ export default class RoleSchema extends BaseUISchema {
         mode: ['edit', 'create'], cell: 'text',
         type: 'collection',
         schema: obj.membershipSchema,
-        disabled: obj.readOnly,
-        canDelete: (state) => !obj.readOnly(state),
+        disabled: (state) => obj.membersReadOnly(state),
+        canDelete: (state) => !obj.membersReadOnly(state),
         canDeleteRow: true,
         helpMessage: obj.isReadOnly ? gettext('Select the checkbox for roles to include WITH ADMIN OPTION.') : gettext('Roles shown with a check mark have the WITH ADMIN OPTION set.'),
       },

web/pgadmin/browser/server_groups/servers/roles/templates/roles/sql/16_plus/permission.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+SELECT
+    rolname, rolcanlogin, rolsuper,
+    -- Whether the connecting user may GRANT/REVOKE membership in this role.
+    -- On PostgreSQL 16 and later the server's own check
+    -- (check_role_membership_authorization and select_best_admin in user.c)
+    -- is has_admin_privs_of_role(): ADMIN OPTION held directly, or through a
+    -- chain of memberships each granted WITH INHERIT TRUE. pg_has_role(...,
+    -- 'WITH ADMIN OPTION') still uses is_admin_of_role(), which ignores
+    -- INHERIT and so says yes where the server answers "no possible
+    -- grantors", hence the explicit walk over pg_auth_members here.
+    (
+        SELECT rolsuper FROM pg_catalog.pg_roles WHERE rolname = current_user
+    ) OR EXISTS (
+        WITH RECURSIVE admin_path(roleid, admin_option, inherit_option) AS (
+            SELECT am.roleid, am.admin_option, am.inherit_option
+            FROM pg_catalog.pg_auth_members am
+            WHERE am.member = (
+                SELECT oid FROM pg_catalog.pg_roles
+                WHERE rolname = current_user
+            )
+            UNION
+            SELECT am.roleid, am.admin_option, am.inherit_option
+            FROM pg_catalog.pg_auth_members am
+            JOIN admin_path p ON am.member = p.roleid
+            WHERE p.inherit_option
+        )
+        SELECT 1 FROM admin_path
+        WHERE roleid = {{ rid }}::OID AND admin_option
+    ) AS has_admin_option
+FROM
+    pg_catalog.pg_roles
+WHERE oid = {{ rid }}::OID

web/pgadmin/browser/server_groups/servers/roles/templates/roles/sql/default/permission.sql

@@ -1,5 +1,14 @@
 SELECT
-    rolname, rolcanlogin, rolsuper
+    rolname, rolcanlogin, rolsuper,
+    -- Whether the connecting user may GRANT/REVOKE membership in this role.
+    -- On PostgreSQL 14 and 15 the server's own check (AddRoleMems/DelRoleMems
+    -- in user.c) is is_admin_of_role(), which walks pg_auth_members without
+    -- regard to rolinherit, and pg_has_role(..., 'WITH ADMIN OPTION') calls
+    -- exactly that function, so this matches the server's rule, including
+    -- ADMIN OPTION held through another role the current user is a member of.
+    pg_catalog.pg_has_role(
+        current_user, {{ rid }}::OID, 'USAGE WITH ADMIN OPTION'
+    ) AS has_admin_option
 FROM
     pg_catalog.pg_roles
 WHERE oid = {{ rid }}::OID

web/pgadmin/browser/server_groups/servers/roles/tests/test_role_admin_option_permission.py

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+##########################################################################
+#
+# pgAdmin 4 - PostgreSQL Tools
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2013 - 2026, The pgAdmin Development Team
+# This software is released under the PostgreSQL Licence
+#
+##########################################################################
+
+import uuid
+
+from flask import render_template
+
+from pgadmin.utils.route import BaseTestGenerator
+from regression import parent_node_dict
+from regression.python_test_utils import test_utils as utils
+
+
+class RoleAdminOptionPermissionTestCase(BaseTestGenerator):
+    """Live test of the has_admin_option column in permission.sql.
+
+    The column must say exactly what the server itself allows for
+    GRANT/REVOKE of the role: ADMIN OPTION held directly, or through
+    another role the current user is a member of. On PostgreSQL 16 and
+    later a membership granted WITH INHERIT FALSE does not carry the
+    ADMIN OPTION along, whereas on 14 and 15 it does. Each case is
+    checked both against the expected value and against whether a real
+    GRANT as that role succeeds, so the template cannot drift from the
+    server's rule unnoticed.
+    """
+    scenarios = [
+        ('Check Role Node', dict(url='/browser/role/obj/'))
+    ]
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.server_id = parent_node_dict["server"][-1]["server_id"]
+        suffix = str(uuid.uuid4())[1:8]
+        self.target = 'adm_target_%s' % suffix
+        self.newmember = 'adm_newmember_%s' % suffix
+        self.holder = 'adm_holder_%s' % suffix
+        self.direct = 'adm_direct_%s' % suffix
+        self.inherited = 'adm_inherited_%s' % suffix
+        self.noinherit = 'adm_noinherit_%s' % suffix
+        self.plain = 'adm_plain_%s' % suffix
+        self.member = 'adm_member_%s' % suffix
+        self.all_roles = [
+            self.target, self.newmember, self.holder, self.direct,
+            self.inherited, self.noinherit, self.plain, self.member
+        ]
+
+        self.connection = utils.get_db_connection(
+            self.server['db'], self.server['username'],
+            self.server['db_password'], self.server['host'],
+            self.server['port'], self.server['sslmode'])
+        self.connection.autocommit = True
+        self.server_version = self.connection.info.server_version
+
+        cur = self.connection.cursor()
+        for role in self.all_roles:
+            cur.execute('CREATE ROLE "%s"' % role)
+        # direct: ADMIN OPTION on the target itself.
+        cur.execute('GRANT "%s" TO "%s" WITH ADMIN OPTION' %
+                    (self.target, self.direct))
+        # holder has ADMIN OPTION; inherited and noinherit are members of
+        # holder, with and without INHERIT respectively.
+        cur.execute('GRANT "%s" TO "%s" WITH ADMIN OPTION' %
+                    (self.target, self.holder))
+        cur.execute('GRANT "%s" TO "%s"' % (self.holder, self.inherited))
+        if self.server_version >= 160000:
+            cur.execute('GRANT "%s" TO "%s" WITH INHERIT FALSE' %
+                        (self.holder, self.noinherit))
+        else:
+            cur.execute('ALTER ROLE "%s" NOINHERIT' % self.noinherit)
+            cur.execute('GRANT "%s" TO "%s"' % (self.holder, self.noinherit))
+        # member: plain membership of the target, no ADMIN OPTION.
+        cur.execute('GRANT "%s" TO "%s"' % (self.target, self.member))
+        cur.execute("SELECT oid FROM pg_catalog.pg_roles WHERE rolname = %s",
+                    (self.target,))
+        self.target_oid = cur.fetchone()[0]
+        cur.close()
+
+    def _has_admin_option(self, as_role):
+        with self.app.app_context():
+            sql = render_template(
+                'roles/sql/#{0}#/permission.sql'.format(self.server_version),
+                rid=self.target_oid, conn=None)
+        cur = self.connection.cursor()
+        try:
+            cur.execute('SET ROLE "%s"' % as_role)
+            cur.execute(sql)
+            row = cur.fetchone()
+            return row[3]
+        finally:
+            cur.execute('RESET ROLE')
+            cur.close()
+
+    def _server_allows_grant(self, as_role):
+        cur = self.connection.cursor()
+        try:
+            cur.execute('SET ROLE "%s"' % as_role)
+            try:
+                cur.execute('GRANT "%s" TO "%s"' %
+                            (self.target, self.newmember))
+            except Exception:
+                return False
+            cur.execute('REVOKE "%s" FROM "%s"' %
+                        (self.target, self.newmember))
+            return True
+        finally:
+            cur.execute('RESET ROLE')
+            cur.close()
+
+    def runTest(self):
+        noinherit_expected = self.server_version < 160000
+        cases = [
+            (self.direct, True),
+            (self.inherited, True),
+            (self.noinherit, noinherit_expected),
+            (self.plain, False),
+            (self.member, False),
+        ]
+        for role, expected in cases:
+            self.assertEqual(
+                self._has_admin_option(role), expected,
+                'has_admin_option for %s' % role)
+            self.assertEqual(
+                self._server_allows_grant(role), expected,
+                'server GRANT authorisation for %s' % role)
+
+        # The properties response carries the flag for the dialog; the
+        # test server user is a superuser, who always qualifies.
+        response = self.tester.get(
+            self.url + str(utils.SERVER_GROUP) + '/' +
+            str(self.server_id) + '/' + str(self.target_oid),
+            follow_redirects=True)
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+        self.assertTrue(response.json['has_admin_option'])
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        cur = self.connection.cursor()
+        for role in self.all_roles:
+            cur.execute('DROP ROLE IF EXISTS "%s"' % role)
+        cur.close()
+        self.connection.close()

web/pgadmin/browser/server_groups/servers/roles/tests/test_role_check_permission_unit_test.py

@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+##########################################################################
+#
+# pgAdmin 4 - PostgreSQL Tools
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2013 - 2026, The pgAdmin Development Team
+# This software is released under the PostgreSQL Licence
+#
+##########################################################################
+
+import json
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+from pgadmin.utils.route import BaseTestGenerator
+from pgadmin.browser.server_groups.servers.roles import RoleView
+
+
+class RoleCheckPermissionTest(BaseTestGenerator):
+    """Unit tests for RoleView._check_permission's ADMIN OPTION carve-out.
+
+    A role holder who is neither a superuser nor a CREATEROLE holder, but
+    who has been granted ADMIN OPTION on the specific role being updated,
+    should be allowed through the permission gate so they can manage that
+    role's membership - but only for 'update', never for 'drop', and the
+    view should record that the request must be restricted to membership
+    changes only.
+    """
+    scenarios = [
+        ('Check Role Node', dict(url='/browser/role/obj/'))
+    ]
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        pass
+
+    def runTest(self):
+        view = RoleView(cmd=None)
+        view.manager = MagicMock()
+
+        # Plain user, no admin option: update is forbidden.
+        view.manager.user_info = {
+            'is_superuser': False, 'can_create_role': False, 'id': 5
+        }
+        view.has_admin_option = False
+        self.assertTrue(view._check_permission(True, 'update', {'rid': 10}))
+        self.assertFalse(view.membership_only_update)
+
+        # Same user, but with ADMIN OPTION on the target role: allowed
+        # through, flagged as membership-only.
+        view.has_admin_option = True
+        self.assertFalse(view._check_permission(True, 'update', {'rid': 10}))
+        self.assertTrue(view.membership_only_update)
+
+        # ADMIN OPTION does not extend to dropping the role.
+        self.assertTrue(view._check_permission(True, 'drop', {'rid': 10}))
+
+        # Superusers are unaffected by the ADMIN OPTION check.
+        view.manager.user_info = {
+            'is_superuser': True, 'can_create_role': False, 'id': 5
+        }
+        view.has_admin_option = False
+        self.assertFalse(view._check_permission(True, 'update', {'rid': 10}))
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        pass
+
+
+class RoleMembersOnlyUpdateRequestKeysTest(BaseTestGenerator):
+    """Regression test for the membership-only update guard.
+
+    _validate_rolemembers() mutates the request dict in place, adding
+    derived keys ('rol_members_list', 'rol_members_revoked_list') that
+    the client never sent. The membership-only update guard in
+    RoleView.update() must check the client-supplied keys captured
+    before that mutation (self.request_keys), not the mutated dict,
+    otherwise a valid ADMIN OPTION request containing only 'rolmembers'
+    would be wrongly rejected as forbidden.
+    """
+    scenarios = [
+        ('Check Role Node', dict(url='/browser/role/obj/'))
+    ]
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        pass
+
+    def runTest(self):
+        view = RoleView(cmd=None)
+        view.manager = MagicMock()
+        view.manager.version = 170000
+
+        data = {
+            'rolmembers': {
+                'added': [
+                    {'role': 'member_role', 'admin': True,
+                     'inherit': True, 'set': True}
+                ],
+                'changed': [],
+                'deleted': []
+            }
+        }
+
+        # Mirror what validate_request() does: capture the client
+        # supplied keys before running the validators.
+        request_keys = set(data)
+
+        # This mutates 'data' in place, adding derived keys.
+        self.assertIsNone(view._validate_rolemembers(10, data))
+        self.assertIn('rol_members_list', data)
+
+        # The mutated dict is no longer a subset of {'rolmembers'} ...
+        self.assertFalse(set(data) <= {'rolmembers'})
+
+        # ... but the keys captured before mutation still are, so the
+        # membership-only guard (which must use request_keys) allows
+        # the request through instead of returning 403.
+        self.assertTrue(request_keys <= {'rolmembers'})
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        pass
+
+
+class RoleUpdateAdminOptionMembershipOnlyTest(BaseTestGenerator):
+    """End-to-end regression test for the ADMIN OPTION membership-only
+    update guard.
+
+    The two tests above exercise _check_permission() and
+    _validate_rolemembers() individually, but neither actually calls
+    validate_request() or RoleView.update(), so a regression that broke
+    how those two decorators interact (e.g. the membership-only guard
+    reading the wrong dict, or request_keys being set/consumed at the
+    wrong point in the chain) would slip past them.
+
+    This test drives RoleView.update() through its real decorator chain
+    (check_precondition -> validate_request -> update) with the driver,
+    connection and SQL rendering mocked out, submitting a 'rolmembers'
+    -only body as a user who holds ADMIN OPTION on the target role (but
+    is neither a superuser nor a CREATEROLE holder), and asserts the
+    request is NOT rejected with 403.
+    """
+    scenarios = [
+        ('Check Role Node', dict(url='/browser/role/obj/'))
+    ]
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        pass
+
+    @patch('pgadmin.browser.server_groups.servers.roles.get_driver')
+    @patch('pgadmin.browser.server_groups.servers.roles.render_template')
+    def runTest(self, render_template_mock, get_driver_mock):
+        view = RoleView(cmd=None)
+
+        manager = MagicMock()
+        manager.version = 170000
+        manager.db_info = None
+        manager.user_info = {
+            'is_superuser': False, 'can_create_role': False, 'id': 5
+        }
+
+        conn = MagicMock()
+        conn.connected.return_value = True
+        # Used for the permission lookup, the ALTER ROLE, and the
+        # post-update node fetch alike; has_admin_option=True is what
+        # drives the ADMIN OPTION carve-out in _check_permission().
+        conn.execute_dict.return_value = (True, {'rows': [{
+            'rolname': 'grp_role', 'rolcanlogin': False, 'rolsuper': False,
+            'has_admin_option': True, 'description': None
+        }]})
+        manager.connection.return_value = conn
+
+        get_driver_mock.return_value.connection_manager.return_value = \
+            manager
+
+        # The body the properties dialog actually sends: the changed
+        # 'rolmembers' collection plus the role's 'oid', which
+        # SchemaState.changes() appends to every edit-mode payload.
+        # 'rolmembers' is exactly what an ADMIN OPTION holder (who may
+        # manage membership only) is allowed to change.
+        body = {
+            'oid': 10,
+            'rolmembers': {
+                'added': [
+                    {'role': 'member_role', 'admin': True,
+                     'inherit': True, 'set': True}
+                ],
+                'changed': [],
+                'deleted': []
+            }
+        }
+
+        with self.app.test_request_context(
+            data=json.dumps(body), content_type='application/json'
+        ):
+            response = view.update(gid=1, sid=1, rid=10)
+
+        # The real _check_permission() call, driven off the mocked
+        # has_admin_option row, must have flagged this as a
+        # membership-only update ...
+        self.assertTrue(view.membership_only_update)
+        # ... and update() must let it through rather than forbidding it.
+        self.assertNotEqual(response.status_code, 403)
+
+        # Anything beyond membership is still forbidden to an ADMIN
+        # OPTION holder, so this can't be used to escalate the role.
+        body['rolsuper'] = True
+        with self.app.test_request_context(
+            data=json.dumps(body), content_type='application/json'
+        ):
+            response = view.update(gid=1, sid=1, rid=10)
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)
+
+        # A body that isn't a JSON object is rejected as a client error
+        # rather than failing with a server error.
+        with self.app.test_request_context(
+            data=json.dumps([{}]), content_type='application/json'
+        ):
+            response = view.update(gid=1, sid=1, rid=10)
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 428)
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        pass

web/regression/javascript/schema_ui_files/role.ui.spec.js

@@ -45,5 +45,42 @@ describe('RoleSchema', ()=>{
   it('properties', async ()=>{
     await getPropertiesView(createSchemaObject(), getInitData);
   });
+
+  describe('membersReadOnly', ()=>{
+    it('is read only for a plain user without ADMIN OPTION on the role', ()=>{
+      const schemaObj = createSchemaObject();
+      const state = {oid: 123, has_admin_option: false, rolmembers: [{role: 'postgres', admin: false}]};
+      expect(schemaObj.membersReadOnly(state)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('is read only when the backend has not said whether ADMIN OPTION is held', ()=>{
+      const schemaObj = createSchemaObject();
+      // Fail closed: a direct admin row in the member list is not enough on
+      // its own, the backend flag is the only thing consulted.
+      const state = {oid: 123, rolmembers: [{role: 'postgres', admin: true}]};
+      expect(schemaObj.membersReadOnly(state)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('is editable for a user the backend reports as holding ADMIN OPTION', ()=>{
+      const schemaObj = createSchemaObject();
+      // Covers ADMIN OPTION inherited through another role too: the user
+      // need not appear in the member list at all.
+      const state = {oid: 123, has_admin_option: true, rolmembers: []};
+      expect(schemaObj.membersReadOnly(state)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('is editable regardless when the user is a superuser/can create roles', ()=>{
+      const schemaObj = new RoleSchema(
+        ()=>new MockSchema(),
+        ()=>new MockSchema(),
+        {
+          role: ()=>[],
+          nodeInfo: {server: {user: {name: 'postgres', id: 0, is_superuser: true}}}
+        },
+      );
+      const state = {oid: 123, rolmembers: []};
+      expect(schemaObj.membersReadOnly(state)).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
 });