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98 lines
4.8 KiB
Markdown
98 lines
4.8 KiB
Markdown
Introduction to PKI
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===================
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This document is designed to give you a brief introduction into how a PKI, or
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Public Key Infrastructure, works.
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Terminology Used
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----------------
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To avoid confusion, the following terms will be used throughout the Easy-RSA
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documentation. Short forms may be substituted for longer forms as convenient.
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* **PKI**: Public Key Infrastructure. This describes the collection of files
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and associations between the CA, keypairs, requests, and certificates.
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* **CA**: Certificate Authority. This is the "master cert" at the root of a
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PKI.
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* **cert**: Certificate. A certificate is a request that has been signed by a
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CA. The certificate contains the public key, some details describing the
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cert itself, and a digital signature from the CA.
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* **request**: Certificate Request (optionally 'req'.) This is a request for a
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certificate that is then send to a CA for signing. A request contains the
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desired cert information along with a digital signature from the private
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key.
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* **keypair**: A keypair is an asymmetric cryptographic pair of keys. These
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keys are split into two parts: the public and private keys. The public key
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is included in a request and certificate.
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The CA
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------
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The heart of a PKI is the CA, or Certificate Authority, and this is also the
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most security-sensitive. The CA private key is used to sign all issued
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certificates, so its security is critical in keeping the entire PKI safe. For
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this reason, it is highly recommended that the CA PKI structure be kept on a
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system dedicated for such secure usage; it is not a great idea to keep the CA
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PKI mixed in with one used to generate end-entity certificates, such as clients
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or servers (VPN or web servers.)
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To start a new PKI, the CA is first created on the secure environment.
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Depending on security needs, this could be managed under a locked down account,
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dedicated system, or even a completely offline system or using removable media
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to improve security (after all, you can't suffer an online break-in if your
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system or PKI is not online.) The exact steps to create a CA are described in a
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separate section. When creating a new CA, the CA keypair (private and public
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keys) are created, as well as the file structure necessary to support signing
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issued certificates.
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Once a CA has been created, it can receive certificate requests from
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end-entities. These entity certificates are issued to consumers of X509
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certificates, such as a client or server of a VPN, web, or email system. The
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certificate requests and certificates are not security-sensitive, and can be
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transferred in whatever means convenient, such as email, flash drive, etc. For
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better security, it is a good idea to verify the received request matches the
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sender's copy, such as by verifying the expected checksum against the sender's
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original.
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Keypairs and requests
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---------------------
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Individual end-entities do not need a full CA set up and will only need to
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create a keypair and associated certificate request. The private key is not used
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anywhere except on this entity, and should never leave that system. It is wise
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to secure this private key with a strong passphrase, because if lost or stolen
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the holder of the private key can make connections appearing as the certificate
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holder.
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Once a keypair is generated, the certificate request is created and digitally
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signed using the private key. This request will be sent to a CA for signing, and
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a signed certificate will be returned.
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How requests become certificates
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--------------------------------
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After a CA signs the certificate request, a signed certificate is produced. In
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this step, the CA's private key is used to digitally sign the entity's public
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key so that any system trusting the CA certificate can implicitly trust the
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newly issued certificate. This signed certificate is then sent back to the
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requesting entity. The issued certificate is not security-sensitive and can be
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sent over plaintext transmission methods.
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Verifying an issued certificate
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-------------------------------
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After 2 entities have created keypairs, sent their requests to the CA, and
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received a copy of their signed certificates and the CA's own certificate, they
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can mutually authenticate with one-another. This process does not require the 2
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entities to have previously exchanged any kind of security information directly.
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During a TLS handshake each side of the connection presents their own cert chain
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to the remote end. Each side checks the validity of the cert received against
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their own copy of the CA cert. By trusting the CA root cert, the peer they are
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talking to can be authenticated.
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The remote end proves it "really is" the entity identified by the cert by
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signing a bit of data using its own private key. Only the holder of the private
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key is able to do this, allowing the remote end to verify the authenticity of
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the system being connected to.
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